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I. INTRODUCTION 
Soon after the drilling of the first oil well in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 
1859, courts were pressed to develop a unique jurisprudence for oil and 
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gas law.1 Seeking solutions to disputes related to these newly valuable 
substances, judges inevitably turned to the familiar terrain of the common 
law.2 For example, according to common law principles governing deeds 
of real property, the phrase ""so long as" created a fee simple 
determinable estate in the grantee, leaving a separate non-possessory 
estate in the grantor, called a "possibility of reverter. " Fee simple 
determinable estates end automatically upon the happening of some 
stated condition.3 At that point, the grantor's "possibility of reverter" 
automatically becomes possessory.4 
Since that "so long as" phrase appears in the typical oil and gas lease to 
limit its duration to as long as production continues, most states quickly 
classified the lease as creating a fee simple determinable in the lessee, 
leaving a possibility of reverter in the lessor.5 For example, Texas courts 
have viewed the oil and gas lease as creating a fee simple determinable 
estate in the lessee since 1923.6 In addition to this estates concept, oil and 
gas law evolved to include many other classic common law doctrines. An 
example includes rules governing cotenants: A producing cotenant must 
account to his cotenants on a net profits basis.7 Basic rules affecting the 
1. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 26-28 (1991) 
(describing the birth and history of the oil and gas industry). The week of August 26, 2009 
marked the 150th anniversary of the Titusville well. Jad Mouawad, After 150 Years, Whither 
Oil?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, available at http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/after-
150-years-whither-oill. 
2. Laura H. Burney, A Pragmatic Approach to Decision Making in the Next Era of Oil and 
Gas Jurisprudence, 16 J. ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 9 (1996) [hereinafter 
Burney, Pragmatic Approach] (explaining that courts analogized to common law doctrines to 
solve early oil and gas disputes) . 
3. CORNELIUS J. MOYNlliAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 32-33 
(2d ed. 1988). A fee simple determinable: 
[E]xpire[s] automatically upon the happening or non-happening of an event stated in 
the conveyance or will creating the estate. Thus, A owning land in fee simple absolute, 
conveys it to B "to have and to hold to B and his heirs so long as the land is used for 
residential purposes . ... " 
!d. Had the grantor conveyed her entire fee simple absolute estate, she would have retained no 
interest in the property. Grantors who convey less than fee simple absolute retain an interest. 
When the conveyed estate is a fee simple determinable, the retained interest is called a 
"possibility of reverter." /d. at 105. To avoid confusion, a possibility of reverter should be 
distinguished from other "reversionary" interests, a distinction the Texas Supreme Court fails to 
make in its decision, as discussed in this article. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
4. MOYNIHAN, supra note 3, at 105. 
5. See A. W. Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in 
Texas , 7 TEX. L. REv. 1, 9 (1928) ("After the execution of a lease we have two separate and 
distinct corporeal freehold estates where only one existed before, .. . a determinable fee estate 
in the oil and gas . .. [and] a possibility of reverter in the oil and gas estate."). 
6. Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290 (1923). Recent 
cases have affirmed this view. See, e.g., Concord Oil Co. v. Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co., 
966 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. 1998); Lucke! v. White, 819 S.W.2d 459 (Tex. 1991). 
7. Byrom v. Pendley, 717 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1986) (discussed in this article, infra 
Part IV .E). 
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transfer of real property interests also apply, such as the notion that one 
cannot convey an interest greater than she owns.8 
The dispute in a 2008 Texas Supreme Court case, Wagner & Brown, 
Ltd. v. Sheppard, involved these basic principles.9 In that case, courts 
considered whether a standard lease pooling clause allows a lessee to 
pool the lessor's possibility of reverter in addition to its fee simple 
determinable estate. Stated differently: Does a lessor's interest remain 
pooled even after her lease terminates? According to the lessor, 
Sheppard, the answer is no. She claimed that when her lease terminated 
the lessee's fee simple determinable estate ended and her possibility of 
reverter became possessory. At that point, Sheppard argued she became 
a cotenant no longer subject to the pooling unit the lessee had committed 
her interest to while the lease was in effect. For that reason, she rejected 
the lessee's payments based on the diluted unit-based royalty she had 
been paid under the terms of the lease pooling clause. Instead, since the 
producing wells were on her property, she claimed that cotenancy 
accounting rules applied. Those rules require a lessee to account to 
unleased cotenants on a net profits basis (Sheppard's 1/8th share of 
profits from wells on her tract less 1/8th of the reasonable drilling and 
operating costs). And because express lease terms require lessees to incur 
all drilling expenses while the lease is in effect, that net profits accounting 
permits an offset for expenses incurred only after her lease terminated.10 
Both the trial court and the court of appeals agreed with Sheppard. 
The Texas Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the lower courts in a 
November 21, 2008 opinion. 11 Viewed from a historical perspective, that 
opinion followed a trend: For more than 10 or even 20 years, the Texas 
Supreme Court consistently has favored producers' legal arguments in oil 
and gas lease disputes. 12 
8. See W. T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., 118 Tex. 509, 517, 19 S.W.2d 27, 28-29 (1929) 
(holding that when lessee 's lease terminated its assignees also lost their rights to the property). 
9. 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008). 
10. For descriptions of Sheppard's arguments, see Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 
198 S.W.3d 369, 374, 378 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006), rev 'd, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008). 
11. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 419. Sheppard filed a motion for rehearing and the court 
requested Wagner & Brown to reply; July 6, 2009 was the court's deadline for ruling on 
Sheppard's motion. However, the court overruled Sheppard's motion on June 5, 2009. !d. 
12. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., No. 05-1076, 2009 WL 795668, at *4, 
*10 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009) (finding mineral/royalty owners ' claims barred by statute of limitations 
and reversing multimillion dollar judgment against Exxon for intentionally sabotaging wells so 
they could not be re-entered); Bowden v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 247 S.W.3d 690, 709 (Tex. 2008) 
(decertifying subclasses of royalty owners seeking royalty underpayment damages); Kerr-McGee 
Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 258 (Tex. 2004) (reversing lower courts ' ruling awarding 
damages for drainage concluding expert's testimony contained "too great an analytical gap" and 
rendering for producer); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Pool, 124 S.W.3d 188, 202 (Tex. 2003) 
(holding that even though leases terminated lessee had reacquired leases by adverse possession); 
In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 745-46 (Tex. 2003) (stating that executive rights owner owed no duty 
to non-participating royalty owner to lease and develop mineral estate and indicating that a duty 
is not triggered in absence of a lease); Union Pac. Res. Group v. Hankins, 111 S.W.3d 69, 75 
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In light of this trend, the Texas Supreme Court's reversal was not 
unexpected. Yet the Sheppard opinion provoked strong reactions among 
oil and gas law practitioners, academics, and others involved in the 
industry.13 In fact, the court received nearly a dozen amicus curiae briefs 
signed by more than 20 attorneys-many of whom typically represent 
producers-urging it to reconsider, citing these and other reasons. 
1. The court contradicted the prevailing view among attorneys 
and others in the oil and gas industry that the standard lease 
pooling clause, such as the one in Sheppard's lease, does not 
permit a lessee to pool the lessor's possibility of reverter, and 
therefore lessors ' interests are no longer pooled after lease 
termination. 
2. The court injected uncertainty into land titles by rejecting 
settled principles and ignoring previous decisions, thereby 
raising myriad questions such as, What does a landowner own 
after her pooled lease terminates? Are deep rights still pooled 
despite prior termination of those rights according to express 
lease clauses? Have old pools been resurrected? If so, when do 
they end? 
(Tex. 2003) (holding royalty underpayment cases could not be maintained as class action 
because of lease language differences); Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, 58 S.W.3d 732, 736-
38 (Tex. 2001) (holding discovery rule barred royalty owner's claim and suggesting that 
contacting company to find information renders such information discoverable); Yzaguirre v. 
KCS Res. , Inc., 53 S.W.3d 368, 372-75 (Tex. 2001) (applying plain meaning approach to lease 
royalty clause and declining to imply covenant to market to "market value at the well" royalty 
provision); HECI Exploration Co. v. Nee!, 982 S.W.2d 881, 885-88 (Tex. 1998) (holding royalty 
owner's cause of action barred by discovery rule because publicly available information 
rendered facts inherently discoverable); Heritage Res. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 130-31 
(Tex. 1996) (charging lessor with post-production costs despite plain language that "no 
deductions" should be charged to lessor); see also John McFarland, Texas Supreme Court Record 
on Royalty Owner Cases, OtL AND GAS LAWYER BLOG, Apr. 6, 2009, http://www.oilandgas 
lawyerblog.corn/2009/04/texas-supreme-court-record-on.html (concluding, "I was unable to find 
any Supreme Court case in the last ten years that ruled in favor of royalty owners."). It appears 
one has to go back to 1986 and 1981 to find solid victories for lessors. See Gavenda v. Strata 
Energy, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 690, 692-93 (Tex. 1986) (holding Middleton's "binding until revoked" 
rule for division orders inapplicable when lessee is unjustly enriched); Amoco v. Alexander, 
622 S.W.2d 563, 567-70 (Tex. 1981) (holding implied covenant of drainage included field-wide 
drainage and suggesting lessees must undertake broad affirmative duties to satisfy that covenant 
such as obtaining a Rule 37 exception). The HECI case, however, significantly retreated from 
Amoco's broad view of implied covenants. See Laura H . Burney, HECI v. Nee! and Proposed 
Discovery Rule L egislation: Point/Counterpoint- The View of the Royalty Owner, ADVANCED 
OIL, GAS & MIN. L. COURSE, § 4.1 (Sept. 21-22, 2000) (hereinafter Burney, HECI v. Nee!] 
(transcript on file with the St. Mary 's Law Journal). 
13. The Texas Lawyer magazine included an article about the case immediately after it was 
released and quoted several attorneys who were critical of the decision. See John Council, 
Pooling Lands, Not Just Leases, TEX. LAWYER, Dec. 1, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/ 
jsp/tx/PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202426366561&hbxlogin=1 ("The Texas Supreme Court threw oil 
and gas lawyers a curve ball on November 21 in a decision that many believe will cause 
uncertainty in disputes between large energy companies and property owners who lease their 
land to the companies for drilling operations."). 
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3. The court departed from its plain meaning approach to lease 
interpretation and encouraged litigation by adopting an 
"equitable" view of lease terms, at least when it favors 
lessees.14 
Not persuaded by these concerns, the court finalized its opinion on 
June 5, 2009. So now the question for players in the oil patch is: What 
hath Wagner & Brown v. Sheppard wrought? This article discusses that 
question, assesses the effects of the Sheppard decision on oil and gas 
jurisprudence, and provides suggestions for addressing the aftermath. 
II. BACKGROUND: POOLING 
Pooling is the combining of several tracts to form a single unit. 15 
Although the terms are frequently used interchangeably, pooling must be 
distinguished from unitization: 
Pooling is the process of combining small tracts into an area of 
sufficient size to merit a well permit under the field's applicable 
spacing rule . . . . Pooling generally occurs while the field is in the 
primary stage of recovery. Unitization, on the other hand, is the 
process of combining all or a large part of the acreage of an entire 
field into a unit. . . . Unitization often occurs during secondary 
recovery after the natural pressure in the field has been dissipated in 
• 16 pnmary recovery. 
Pooling has two primary effects on the oil and gas lease: First, it erases 
lease lines, meaning that production from anywhere in the pooled unit 
constitutes production for a lease in the unit, even if the well is not on the 
leased tract. Pooling prevents a lease from terminating even when there is 
no production in paying quantities from that tract, as required by the 
lease's habendum (or term) clause. Stated differently, the lease pooling 
clause is also a lease savings clause for the lessee. Second, pooling affects 
the lessee's obligations to owners in the pooled unit. For example, a lease 
generally requires a lessee to pay its lessor a royalty based on a fractional 
14. Pro-Sheppard Amicus Curiae briefs included briefs filed by oil and gas attorneys who 
represent landowners and producers, all with more than 20 and even 30 years of experience: the · 
Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Association; the Midland law firm of Cotton, 
Bledsoe, Tighe & Dawson, P.C.; four former Chairs of the Oil, Gas, and Energy Resources Law 
Section of the State Bar of Texas; several lawyers board-certified in oil and gas law; and those 
with extensive expertise in title opinions. The author was one of the attorneys who wrote in 
support of Sheppard's motion for rehearing. The following filed Amicus Curiae Briefs in support 
of the supreme court's opinion: (1) Chesapeake Energy Corp., Forest Oil Corp., and XTO 
Energy, Inc.; (2) Texas Civil Justice League, Inc.; (3) Marc L. Skeen; and (4) Lynch, Chappell & 
Alsup, P.C. 
15. JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS: A 
STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL POLICIES 7-8 (1986) [hereinafter 
WEAVER, UNITIZATION]. Confusion also occurs between a reference to a pooled unit and units 
formed for secondary recovery through unitization. 
16. ld. 
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amount of the production or the proceeds from the sale of that 
production from wells producing on the leased premises. Pooling changes 
that contractual obligation by requiring the lessor to accept a diluted 
royalty, one typically calculated on a surface-acreage basis (the number 
of acres of her tract compared to the total number of acres in the unit).17 
This diluted royalty formula applies even if the well is drilled on the 
pooled lessor's tract. 
Forming pooled units is essential in the oil and gas industry. It prevents 
waste, insures efficient production of oil and gas, and protects correlative 
rights of mineral estate owners.18 For that reason, most major producing 
states long ago passed compulsory pooling acts. 19 Notoriously slow to 
follow that path, Texas passed an act in 1965 known as the Mineral 
Interest Pooling Act ("MIPA").20 Unlike acts in other states, however, 
authorities view the MIP A as limited in function, less a compulsory act 
than an act to encourage voluntary pooling.21 In fact, in Texas pooled 
units formed pursuant to the MIPA are relatively rare.22 
Therefore, in Texas the lease pooling clause serves as the most 
common method for creating pooled units.23 Armed with that clause, the 
17, For example, assume tract X, a 40-acre tract under a lease providing for a l/8th royalty, is 
pooled with another 40-acre tract, and the lessee drills a producing well on tract X. Absent 
pooling the lessor in tract X would receive l/8th of the production or proceeds, cost-free, from 
the well drilled on her tract. In light of the pooling, however, she has contracted to receive 
40/80ths, or 1/2 of the 1/8th royalty set forth in her lease. 
18. See WEAVER, UNITIZATION supra note 15, at 22-24. , 
19. /d. at 21-22. States began passing compulsory pooling laws in the 1940s and 1950s. 
20. MIPA, TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN.§ 102 (Vernon 2001). Professor Jacqueline Weaver 
has analyzed and criticized Texas's approach to pooling and unitization. See, e.g. , Jacqueline 
Lang Weaver, The Politics of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence: The Eighty-Six Percent Factor , 
33 WASHBURN L.J. 492, 499 (1994) [hereinafter Weaver, Politics] ("Texas is unique. It is the 
largest oil and gas producing state in the United States, yet it has the weakest pooling and 
unitization laws. "). 
21. ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS 12-7 
(Lexis Nexis 2009) (hereinafter SMITH & WEAVER]. 
22. Carroll Martin & D. Davin McGinnis, All for One and One For All: A Primer on Pooling 
in Texas, 31 ERNEST E. SMITH OIL, GAS & MIN. L. INST. 2, at 1 (2005), available at 
http://www.utcle.org/eLibrary/preview.php?asset_file_id=553. 
23. In addition to pooling acts and lease clauses, pooling occurs when a community lease is 
executed. A community lease is a single lease covering two or more separate tracts. "In Texas, 
execution of a community lease creates a strong presumption that the parties intended to pool 
their interests, with royalties being apportioned on the basis of the number of acres each lessor 
has contributed to the community lease. " JOHNS. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW IN A NUTSHELL 
242 (2009) (hereinafter LOWE, NUTSHELL]. 
Texas has rejected the concept of equitable or judicial pooling. See Ryan Consol. Petrol. 
Corp. v. Pickens, 266 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. Civ. App.- Texarkana 1954), affd, 155 Tex. 221 , 
285 S.W.2d 201 (1955) (discussed in LOWE ET AL. , CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS 
LAW 189-90 (2008) (hereinafter LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS] (noting Texas has 
rejected equitable pooling and explaining that "according to this doctrine, when a well is drilled 
on an established spacing unit, the land within the unit is automatically pooled as a matter of 
law")). 
A note regarding the author's citations to casebooks and Lowe's Nutshell: In law review 
articles, authors generally refrain from citing such sources, at least as primary authority. For this 
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lessee is free to commit the tract to a pooled unit and sign a separate unit 
agreement with other participating producers. Without a pooling clause, 
the lessee cannot pool the lease and affect the lessor's rights. Indeed, if a 
lessee pools without authority and a well is drilled on the leased premises, 
that lessee must account to its lessor for the full lease royalty on 
production from the well, even though the lessee receives only a diluted 
share of the production pursuant to the unit agreement it signed. This 
liability occurs because lessors do not sign the lessees' unit agreements or 
designations; therefore, lessors are not bound by contractual terms in 
those agreements, including terms allocating production and diluting 
royalty payments.24 As described below, however, the Texas Supreme 
Court overlooked this fact, and many others, in the Sheppard opinion. 
III. FACTS 
Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard involves pooling accomplished 
under a lease pooling clause.25 Jane Sheppard owns an undivided 1/8th 
mineral interest in 62.72 acres in Upshur County. In 1994 she leased her 
interest, as did the owners of the other 7/8ths interests, in the 62.72 acre 
tract.26 Sheppard's lease provides for a 1/4th landowner's royalty.27 
Ironically, her lease is not a pro-producer form.28 Instead, it contains 
several clauses landowners often desire but often cannot negotiate into 
their lease forms. 29 For example, although the royalty obligation typically 
is written as a covenant, that is, as a contractual promise to pay, rather 
than as a terminating condition, her lease specifically states in an 
addendum that if the lessee fails to pay timely, the lease automatically 
ends.30 
article, however, such authorities are particularly significant to show the extent to which the 
Texas Supreme Court 's opinion literally departs from basic textbook oil and gas law principles. 
24. LOWE, NUTSHELL, supra note 23, at 241. 
25. 282 S.W.3d 419, 421-22 (Tex. 2008). 
26. /d. 
27. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d 369, 371 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006), 
rev'd , 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008). An unofficial copy of the Sheppard lease is available through 
the Upshur County Clerk Records at http://countyofupshur.com:8000/detail.aspx?doc=03945-
1995&ms=O&n=03945-1995. 
28. Practitioners often refer to a "Producers 88" to denote a classic pro-producer form . 
See, e. g., JUDON FAMBROUGH, HINTS ON NEGOTIATING AN OIL AND GAS LEASE 1 (1997), 
available at http://recenter.tamu.edu/pdf/229.pdf. Commentators, however, note that there is no 
standard oil and gas lease. See id. ("No standard or universal lease form is used by the oil and gas 
industry."). 
29. Examples of other pro-lessor clauses include: a no deductions from royalty provision, 
surface use restrictions, an indemnification clause, and notice requirements. See id. 
30. The clause is in the addendum paragraph 15(k) and is set forth in the Sheppard opinion. 
282 S.W.3d at 421. 
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A. The "Standard" Pooling Clause in Sheppard's Lease 
Sheppard's pooling provision, however, is one the court labels a 
"standard industry pooling clause. "31 Indeed, the amicus briefs also view 
the clause as one commonly encountered in practice. As described above, 
the clause contains a savings provision clarifying that "[p]roduction, 
drilling or reworking operations anywhere on a unit which includes all or 
any part of the leased premises shall be treated as if it were production, 
drilling or reworking operations on the leased premises .... "32 Because 
there was production from the unit-the wells on Sheppard's tract-this 
clause was not an issue in the case. In fact, because there was production 
from the unit, none of the other lessors claimed that their leases, or the 
unit, had terminated. Yet as discussed below, the Texas Supreme Court's 
opinion assumes that unit termination is the issue in the case.33 
1. The Royalty Calculation for Pooling: A Covenant, Not a Conveyance 
of Royalty 
Sheppard's pooling clause also contains standard language that 
changes the lessee's royalty obligation after pooling from a tract-based to 
a unit-based formula: "[After pooling] production on which Lessor's 
royalty is calculated shall be that proportion of the total unit production 
which the net acreage covered by this lease and included in the unit bears 
to the total gross acreage in the unit ... . "34 Wagner & Brown viewed this 
provision as granting the lessee the power to pool the lessor's interest 
beyond the life of the lease.35 
31. /d. at 422. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. 
34. /d. 
35. See Petitioners' [Wagner & Brown's] Response to Motion for Rehearing at 7, Wagner & 
Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008) (No. 06-0845), 2009 WL 665157 ("More 
fundamentally, the argument that the lease only granted the lessee the power to pool its own 
interest is irreconcilable with the well-established principle that a pooling clause grants the lessee 
the power to pool the lessor 's royalty interest."). In support of this statement, Wagner & Brown 
cites treatises that state, for example: "A pooling clause gives the lessee the power to pool or 
combine the royalty owner's interest without further approval of the royalty owner." /d. (citing 
1 BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION at 8-1 
(3d ed. 2008)). But those authorities continue to clarify that the reference to the " royalty owner's 
interest" in the pooling context, refers to the lands subject to the lease, not the possibility of 
reverter. In fact, the Texas Supreme Court's opinion cites the same Kramer & Martin treatise, 
which opines that pooling does not last after a lease terminates; however, the court rejects that 
view. See discussion infra Part V.C & n.142. The pooling clause simply does not state that 
pooling pools the royalty and possibility of reverter in addition to the leased premises. Another 
pro-Sheppard amicus brief responded this way: 
[Wagner & Brown's] argument demonstrates a fundamental ignorance of an oil and 
gas lease, and ignores the simple explanation. 
The royalty obligation is a covenant that burdens the Leased Premises, and there 
can be no doubt that when the lessor authorizes the Jessee to pool the Leased 
Premises, that authority includes the royalty. In fact, a substantial part of the pooling 
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That view of the royalty provision in a pooling clause, however, is 
incorrect. Pooling provisions do not convey lessors' royalty interests or 
their possibilities of reverter. No such language of conveyance appears in 
the pooling clause or in any part of the oil and gas lease. Instead, as the 
court of appeals in Sheppard recognizes, a pooling clause permits a lessee 
to pool not the lessor's royalty, but the lessee's estate-the fee simple 
determinable.36 For that reason, the pooling power should not be viewed 
as creating a power of attorney in the lessee to pool the lessor's interest.37 
Instead, that clause creates contractual rights in the lessee that allow it: 
(1) to pool its fee simple determinable estate in the leased property with 
other tracts to create pooled units, without contacting the lessor; and 
(2) to change the lessee's royalty obligation after pooling from a well or 
tract-based calculation to a diluted, unit-based calculation.38 
2. The First Sentence of the Pooling Clause: The Texas Supreme 
Court's Interpretative Focus 
Rather than rely on the royalty-calculation provision, the Texas 
Supreme Court focuses primarily on the first sentence in the pooling 
clause: "Lessee shall have the right but not the obligation to pool all or 
any part of the leased premises or interest therein with any other lands or 
interests .. .. "39 The court then turns immediately to language in the 
lessee's unit agreement, noting that it combined "leases and lands."40 
However, the court misinterprets the role and meaning of both the unit 
agreement language and the lead sentence in the pooling clause, and 
adopts, among others, these two mistaken premises: (1) lessors are bound 
clause in the Sheppard lease is spent explaining how royalty is to be paid once the 
Leased Premises are pooled. 
However, the possibility of reverter is a separate estate vested in the 
lessor, ... nowhere does the lease authorize the lessee to pool it. Petitioners ' failure to 
grasp this fundamenta l concept is astonishing to any lawyer who regularly deals with 
oil and gas leases. 
Reply Brief of Amicus Curiae of Dick Watt to Petitioners' Response to Motion for Rehearing 
at 5, Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (No. 06-0845), 2009 ~L 908300 [hereinafter Reply Brief of Dick 
Watt). (Mr. Watt is a former chair of the Oil, Gas, and Energy Resources Law Council of the 
State Bar of Texas). 
36. See discussion of court of appeals opinion infra Part IV. 
37. But see LOWE, NUTSHELL, supra note 23, at 243 ("A typical pooling clause grants the 
lessee a power of attorney to pool the lessor's interests. "). But Professor Lowe continues to 
describe the pooling clause as changing "the result that would otherwise occur under the lease." 
!d. This statement is consistent with the view that the pooling clause simply contains contractual 
provisions that allow the lessee to pool without contacting the lessor and to change its royalty 
obligation after pooling. Viewing the pooling clause as creating contractual rights rather than as 
a power of attorney also avoids the argument that the clause imposes fiduciary duties on a lessee 
like those imposed on one granted a power of attorney. 
38. See LOWE, NUTSHELL, supra note 23, at 246. 
39. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 422-23. 
40. !d. 
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by lessees' unit agreements; and (2) a standard pooling clause allows a 
lessee to pool the lessor's possibility of reverter. 41 
B. The Dispute: Did Sheppard's Interest Remain Pooled After Her Lease 
Terminated? 
The facts that placed that second premise into contention were these: 
In September 1996, over two years after Sheppard signed her lease, her 
lessee pooled her interest into the 122-acre W.M. Landers Gas Unit. This 
unit was composed of the Sheppard tract, including leases from the 
owners of the other undivided 7/8ths mineral interests in Sheppard's 
tract, and leases on eight other tracts. In October 1996 a gas well located 
on Sheppard's tract, called the Landers No. 1, was completed and began 
producing. Nearly a year later, in September 1997 a second well, the 
Landers No. 2, also located on Sheppard's tract, began producing.42 
In September 2000 Wagner & Brown took over as operator of the 
Landers Unit and discovered that Sheppard had not been paid royalties 
by the prior lessee according to the timeline in her lease. Recognizing 
that her lease had terminated on March 1, 1997 according to its express 
terms, Wagner & Brown offered Sheppard a new lease, which she 
declined. Although Wagner & Brown recognized that Sheppard's status 
shifted from lessor to unleased cotenant, it contended that her interest 
remained subject to the pooled unit, including provisions diluting 
payments owed to her.43 
Sheppard sued Wagner & Brown for the following: (1) failure to pay 
her based on her full undivided 1!8th mineral interest, undiluted by the 
pooling formula; (2) failure to properly account to her after lease 
termination as a cotenant by charging her with expenses incurred while 
her lease was in effect; and (3) failure to properly account by charging her 
with expenses on an aggregate basis (deducting costs from one well from 
revenues of another well), rather than on a well-by-well basis. This 
accounting question arose because Wagner & Brown sought to deduct 
costs of an expensive and unprofitable workover on the No.1 well from 
revenues from the No. 2 well.44 
C. The Trial Court: Sheppard Wins 
The trial court agreed with Sheppard on all points. It noted that 
Sheppard automatically became a cotenant with the producers-owners in 
41. See id. at 422-24. 
42. !d. at 421. 
43. !d. at 421-22. 
44. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d 369,372 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006), 
rev'd, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008) . 
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the unit on March 1, 1997, the date her lease terminated according to the 
royalty payment timeline. After that date, Sheppard was entitled to 
receive from the Landers No.1 and No.2 wells an undivided 1/Sth of the 
net revenues attributable to her interest on a tract basis, not a pooled 
basis. In determining that net amount, Wagner & Brown could charge 
against the wells' revenues 1/Sth of the necessary and reasonable costs of 
producing and marketing the minerals from those wells after lease 
termination, but not those incurred while the lease was in effect. 
Moreover, only costs figured on a well-by-well basis, not an aggregate 
basis, could be charged against Sheppard's interest.45 
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION: SHEPPARD WINS 
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings.46 In 
its written opinion, the court describes the initial issue in the case as, "Is 
Sheppard's Interest Still Subject to the Pooled Unit?"47 The court's 
answer: No.48 
A. "Is Sheppard's Interest Still Subject to the Pooled Unit?" No 
As the court began its analysis of this issue, it noted, "We have been 
unable to find anything in Texas caselaw directly on point to control our 
analysis."49 However, an explanation exists for the lack of pinpoint 
authority on the question of whether pooling ends when the lease ends. 
That proposition has never been questioned- by attorneys, academics, 
title examiners, or courts-because the answer has never been in doubt. 50 
Instead, in a statement echoed by all of Sheppard's amici and other 
attorneys, the brief filed by the Texas Independent Producers and 
Royalty Owners Association ("TIPRO") proclaimed: 
[N]o lessee, lessor or mineral owner in this state believes, 
understands, or intends the possibility of reverter owned by the 
original grantor (lessor) of a lease, or its heirs or assigns, to be 
pooled by standard form pooling language into a production unit by 
the lessee's unilateral declaration of pooling, or to remain or become 
pooled in the production unit after the underlying lease terminates 
45. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, No. 486-97 (115th Dist. Ct., Upshur County, Tex. 
Feb. 23, 2005). 
46. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d at 371. 
47. ld. at 374. 
48. /d. at 377. 
49. /d. at 374. 
50. See SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 21, at 4-123 ("The widespread assumption prior to the 
decision was that a lessee has no authority to pool the lessor's possibility of reverter and the 
lessor's interest is no longer within a pooled unit after the lease expires. "). 
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for whatever reason. This has never been the law m Texas, nor 
should it be.51 
B. The Ladd Case Does Not Control 
231 
Seeking guidance, the court of appeals reviewed Ladd Petroleum 
Corp. v. Eagle Oil and Gas Co.,52 an appellate case out of the Fort Worth 
Court of Appeals that the Texas Supreme Court ultimately considered 
controlling.53 But as the court of appeals concluded, Ladd is: 
[F]ar different from the instant case in one important respect: in 
Ladd, the litigants were attempting to terminate the entire pool-or 
perhaps obtain a declaration that, when one pool participant is no 
longer in the pool, then the pool ceases to exist. Here, Sheppard 
merely insists that her participation in the pool has terminated, not 
that the entire pool has terminated.54 
Although the court of appeals accurately assessed Ladd as "far 
different" than Sheppard, the court could have been more emphatic in 
rejecting Ladd as precedent. The controlling issue in Ladd was whether a 
lease, known as the Blair lease, had terminated according to its plain 
terms. In Sheppard the parties agreed that her lease had terminated 
according to its terms: Sheppard was not paid according to the tirneline 
required for royalty payments. In Ladd the issue was whether the Blair 
lease had terminated according to the language of its habendum clause. 
The clause provided for a primary term of five years and "as long 
thereafter as 'oil, gas or other mineral is produced from said land or land 
with which said land is pooled hereunder. "'55 The Blair lease was pooled 
with the Woody lease. A producing well was drilled on the Woody lease. 
As the court noted, " It was production from that unit well which kept the 
(Blair] leases alive after 1960."56 Ladd eventually became lessee of both 
leases. In 1976 it inadvertently released the Woody lease. At that point, 
51. Amicus Brief of Tex. Ind. Prod. and Royalty Owners Ass'n at 6, Wagner & Brown, Ltd. 
v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008) (No. 06-0845), 2009 WL 357423; accord Amicus Curiae 
Brief of Herbert W. Henry at 14, Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (No. 06-0845) ("[P]rior to this case 
the overwhelming majority of persons engaged in the oil and gas business did not construe the 
standard industry pooling clause as authorizing a pool to survive lease termination. The Court 's 
opinion in this case was a surprise to everyone I know."). (Mr. Henry has practiced oil and gas 
law for 37 years.). See also Patton Boggs LLP, Oil and Gas Alert: The Texas Supreme Court's 
Decision in Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, Mar. 2009, http:/lwww.pattonboggs.com/ 
news/Detail.aspx?news=746 ("In no cases or instances has the pooling of lands under a lease 
been construed as a pooling of the underlying minerals free of the lease-until this case."). 
52. 695 S.W.2d 99, 106 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ refd n.r.e.). 
53. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Tex. 2008). 
54. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d at 375. 
55. Ladd, 695 S.W.2d at 101 (emphasis added). 
56. /d. 
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the Blairs argued their lease also terminated, giving them the right to 
lease to a new producer. They also claimed the unit had terminated. 57 
Ladd argued that the unit had not terminated because one of the two 
leases had not terminated. According to Ladd, even if the Woody lease 
had terminated upon its release, the Blair lease never terminated. 
Therefore, in order to determine whether the unit had terminated, the 
court first had to examine whether the Blair lease had terminated 
according to the terms of its habendum clause.58 The habendum clause 
specifically provided that production from other "land" with which the 
Blair lease had been pooled would maintain the Blair lease. Maintaining 
the lease was not limited to production from the Blair tract. Because the 
well on other pooled "land"-the Woody lease well-was producing, the 
court held that production maintained the Blair lease, even if the Woody 
lease had been released. Because one of the two leases in the unit 
continued, the unit continued. 59 
As the court of appeals in Sheppard concluded, Ladd never addressed 
the Sheppard issue: Whether a standard lease pooling clause pools the 
lessor's possibility of reverter in addition to the lessee's estate.60 The 
Texas Supreme Court's opinion, however, fails to recognize that fact and 
considers Ladd support for its answer to an issue the Sheppard parties 
never raised: Whether the unit had terminated. 61 Seeking an answer to 
the actual issue in the case, the appellate court turned to applicable oil 
and gas law and other property principles. 
C. The Cross Conveyance Theory of Pooling: Instructive But Not 
Determinative 
To begin, the court noted that an "original explanation" for the effect 
of pooling was the cross-conveyance of interests theory.62 According to 
that theory, pooling results in a conveyance of title among all participants 
in the pooled unit, and each acquires a proportionate property interest in 
57. !d. at 101--D2. 
58. !d. at 107. "As we read the leases, the power to unpool was not vested in the lessee. 
Therefore, an unpooling could only come about through an agreement of the lessors, or through 
a cessation of production as provided for in the habendum clauses." /d. The amicus briefs in the 
Ladd case note that title examiners generally view a pooled unit as terminated once all the leases 
in that unit have terminated. 
59. !d. at 106. The court concluded that because the Blair lease was maintained by 
production from the Woody "lands" despite the release of the Woody lease, the unit did not 
terminate: "Despite this elimination of the leasehold interest through release, the unit did not 
terminate." /d. 
60. See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d 369, 375 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 
2006), rev'd, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008). 
61. See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2008) ("Does 
Termination of the Lease Also Terminate the Unit?"). 
62. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d at 376. 
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the others' lands.63 Many states have specifically rejected that theory, 
noting instead that pooling creates merely contract rights among the 
parties in a unit. In Texas most leases achieve that result by including the 
royalty-calculation formula that applies after pooling while also expressly 
stating that pooling does not affect a cross-conveyance of interests.64 
Because the Sheppard lease contains such a no cross-conveyance clause, 
the court of appeals (at least in part) discounted that theory as guidance 
for resolving the underlying issue in the case.65 Instead, the court viewed 
the cross-conveyance theory as merely clarifying that pooling affects the 
parties' real property interests. Therefore, the court carefully analyzed 
the nature of those property interests. 
D. A Property Law Analysis: A Lessee Owns a Fee Simple Determinable 
and Can Pool "No More Than It Owned" 
The court of appeals began its property law analysis with a review of 
the estate created by an oil and gas lease: 
[T]he lessee in the usual oil and gas lease obtains a determinable fee 
in the oil and gas in place and, thus, obtains an interest in realty. As a 
determinable fee interest, it will last only for the primary term or so 
long as oil or gas is produced, or, as in this case, until some other 
event occurs that results in termination.66 
Next, the court relies on the basic notion that one cannot convey more 
than he owns: "Even though the lessee had the right to pool the property, 
it could pool no more than it owned, and it only had an ownership 
interest in the mineral estate until that right was terminated."67 
To restate that proposition, the court invoked the classic concept from 
first-year law school property courses, the bundle of sticks: 
It is uncontested that Wagner had the authority to agree on the unit 
designation and to commit Sheppard's interest to that unit. That 
authority, however, existed only because the lease existed, which 
transferred a "bundle of sticks" to Wagner for safekeeping. Wagner 
could not have transferred more than it had available-and ... the 
63. ld. (citing Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex. 1968)). The cross-
conveyance theory originated in Veal v. Thomason, a case in which pooling occurred because of 
a community lease. 138 Tex. 341, 159 S.W.2d 472 (1942). A community lease is a single lease 
signed by several tract owners. That case raised a procedural issue: whether all owners were 
necessary parties in litigation against one owner regarding a title defect. ld. at 343, 159 S.W.2d at 
473. For a criticism of the cross-conveyance theory, see Joseph J. French, Jr. & Frank W. Elliott, 
Jr. , The Legal Effect of Voluntary Pooling and Unitization: Theories and Party Practice, 35 TEX. 
L. REV. 401 (1957). 
64. LOWE, NUTSHELL, supra note 23, at 250. 
65. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d at 376 n.5. 
66. !d. at 376. 
67. ld. at 377. 
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termination automatically returned the "bundle" to the mineral 
owner free and clear of encumbrances.68 
E. Cotenancy Accounting Analysis: Background 
Once Sheppard's interest was "free and clear" of the lease, and the 
pooling allowed by that lease, she became an unleased cotenant. 
Therefore, cotenancy accounting rules applied from that point forward. 
The court described the transition: "The simple fact is that these parties 
were in one relationship [lessor-lessee) and that relationship ended. 
When it did, their respective responsibilities and duties necessarily 
changed to reflect the differences in the relationship."69 
In assessing those duties, the court followed literally textbook cotenant 
accounting principles. In Texas and most states, an owner of an undivided 
interest in the mineral estate has the right to develop the minerals 
himself, or, in the usual case, lease his minerals to a third-party lessee, 
without joinder of his other mineral cotenants.70 However, the developing 
owner or his lessee has a duty to account to the other cotenants.71 One 
treatise sets forth those accounting rules as follows: 
Each non-joining co-tenant has the right to receive his proportionate 
share of the products produced, but must bear the reasonable costs 
of development, production and marketing. The producing co-
tenant, however has a right of recoupment, and he may retain all of 
the production until he has recouped his costs. Where production is 
insufficient to cover the costs of development and production, the 
non-joined co-tenant is under no personal liability for his share of 
the excessive costs.72 
The court of appeals relied upori often-cited Texas cases that followed 
these and other accounting principles, including Byrom v. Pendley,73 
Hunt v. HNG Oil Co./4 and Broadway v. Stone.75 These cases merit 
68. !d. The court continued with its property law analysis, concluding again that "(t]he 
property rights possessed by Wagner vanished, and when they did, so necessarily did the rights 
to that property that were dependent on Wagner's lease. The first point of error is overruled." In 
the process of reaching this conclusion, the court also rejected Wagner's claim that the pooling 
clause created an agency relationship between the lessor and lessee that allowed the pooling to 
extend beyond the life of the lease. !d. That conclusion is appropriate since, while in Texas and 
other states the oil and gas lease is not viewed as creating a fiduciary relationship between the 
parties, an agent does owe its beneficiaries a fiduciary duty. LOWE, NUTSHELL, supra note 23, at 
102. Therefore, the court of appeals correctly views the lease pooling power as a contractual 
right that allows lessees to pool their fee simple determinable estates, but not the lessor's 
possibility of reverter. 
69. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d at 377. 
70. LOWE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 23, at 567. 
71. See, e.g., Byrom v. Pendley, 717 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1986). 
72. RICHARDW. HEMINGWAY, THE LAWOFOILAND GAS 203 (3d ed. 1991). 
73. 717 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1986). 
74. 791 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied). 
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review because in reversing the court of appeals in Sheppard, the Texas 
Supreme Court also contradicts the appellate court's view of these cases. 
In Byrom v. Pendley, Byrom had a lease from the owner of an 
undivided 11/24ths interest in property and took a second lease from the 
owners of an undivided 12/24ths interest in the same tract.76 Pendley had 
previously leased the 12/24ths interest, but Byrom claimed the Pendley 
lease was invalid and sued him. While the lawsuit was pending, Byrom 
drilled a producing well. Pendley ultimately won that lawsuit, meaning he 
and Byrom were cotenants-lessees in the property. As the producing 
cotenant, Byrom agreed he owed Pendley a duty to account on a net 
profits basis.77 Pendley, however, asserted that Byrom became a bad faith 
trespasser by disputing Pendley's title. In equity, good faith trespassers 
are entitled to recoup their reasonable and necessary costs to the extent 
they benefit a true owner.78 Bad faith trespassers, however, are subject to 
a harsh rule and may not recover their costs.79 
While the court of appeals agreed with Pendley, the Texas Supreme 
Court reversed. 80 In its opinion, the court clarified that because Byrom 
had one valid lease from another cotenant that never terminated, he was 
never a trespasser. Therefore, rules governing trespassing improvers did 
not apply. Rather, as Byrom had claimed, cotenancy accounting rules 
applied. These cotenancy accounting rules mirror those owed by good 
faith trespassers: He owed his non-producing cotenant an accounting on a 
net profits basis, which allowed him to deduct reasonable and necessary 
expenses from Pendley's proportionate share of production.81 
While Byrom did not involve a trespassing driller, those facts did arise 
in Hunt v. HNG Oil Co.82 In that case, the lessee entered under a valid 
lease, drilled a dry hole, then after the lease terminated, plugged back to 
a shallower formation and drilled a producing well. In light of the original 
lease, the lessee was considered a good faith trespasser entitled to deduct 
its reasonable costs of the producing well. However, the lessee was not 
allowed to recoup its initial drilling costs of the dry hole because those 
75. 15 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved). 
76. Byrom, 717 S.W.2d at 604. 
77. Byrom v. Pendley, 703 S.W.2d 405, 406 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986), rev'd, 717 S.W.2d 
602 (Tex. 1986). 
78. LOWE ET AL. , CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 23, at 101. 
79. !d. at 101-02 (describing "harsh" measure of damages applied to bad faith trespassers). 
80. Byrom, 717 S.W.2d at 604. 
81. /d. at 605. This opinion is also known for having distinguished Humble Oil & Refining 
Co. v. Kishi, 276 S.W. 190 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, judgm't adopted), rehearing granted, 
291 S.W. 538 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, holding approved). Kishi addressed the measure of 
damages owed by Humble when it drilled a dry hole after its lease had terminated. There the 
court awarded market value of the right to lease. !d. at 191. The Byrom court noted Kishi 
involved a trespasser because the well was drilled after the lease had terminated. Byrom, 717 
S.W.2d at 605; see also LOWE, NUTSHELL, supra note 23, at 52. 
82. Hunt v. HNG Oil Co., 791 S.W. 2d 191 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied). 
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costs were incurred under a valid lease before the lessee became a 
trespasser. 83 
As support for its conclusion, the court in Hunt relied on Broadway v. 
Stone. 84 In that case, a lessee drilled wells on a tract believing the lease 
covered all owners. In fact, the Broadways owned a 1/36th interest. The 
Broadways conveyed their land to Miller. At the time Miller acquired his 
interest there were four producing wells and one well under construction, 
which later produced. Miller became the sole plaintiff seeking an 
accounting from the lessee. The court concluded the lessee was allowed 
to recoup costs incurred after Miller acquired his interest, which excluded 
the initial costs of the four wells. In other words, the lessee was not a 
trespasser as to Miller until after the date Miller acquired his interest, so 
it could recoup only costs it incurred after that date. Since the lessee in 
Hunt did not become a trespasser until after its lease terminated, the 
Hunt court found Broadway "sufficiently analogous to our facts."85 
Relying on these and other cases, and the accounting principles they 
embraced, the court of appeals addressed and answered the following 
accounting issues that the trial court had resolved in Sheppard's favor. 
1. Can Wagner & Brown Recoup Expenses Incurred Before 
Termination? No 
The court of appeals devoted relatively little analysis in its opinion to 
answering this "simple" question about whether Sheppard was liable for 
expenses incurred while her lease was in effect: "Wagner has directed us 
to no rule of law that would in some way make her retroactively liable for 
such expenses and costs, and has advanced no convincing argument to 
justify such an action."86 
As described below, however, the Texas Supreme Court disagrees and 
determines that equitable rules for good faith trespassers or improvers 
supply a convincing argument to possibly charge Sheppard with pre-
termination costs.87 As revealed in the discussion above of Byrom, Hunt, 
and Broadway, when those rules apply, they trigger accounting rules 
similar to those owed by producing cotenants. For example, a builder 
who mistakenly builds a house on the wrong lot may recover certain costs 
on an equitable basis. Equitable rules apply precisely because the builder 
has no contract with the lot owner, yet that owner may be unjustly 
enriched by the structure. 
83. ld. at 194. 
84. Broadway v. Stone, 15 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Cornrn'n App. 1929, holding approved). 
85. Hunt, 791 S.W.2d at 194. 
86. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d 369, 378 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006), 
rev'd, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008). 
87. See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419,429-30 (Tex. 2008). 
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In its Byrom decision discussed above, the Texas Supreme Court 
clarified the role of those rules. Because a cotenant is not a trespasser, 
good faith trespasser rules do not define the duty owed by a producing 
cotenant to non-joined cotenants.88 Similarly, as the court in Hunt 
recognized, a lessee is not a trespasser or mistaken improver while the 
lease is in effect, so again equitable rules have no relevance. Instead, as 
the Hunt court concluded, while the lease remains in effect, those terms 
govern the parties ' relationship.89 To repeat the Sheppard appellate 
court's summary of the transition from lease terms to cotenancy 
accounting rules: "The simple fact is that these parties were in one 
relationship and that relationship ended."90 As discussed below, the Texas 
Supreme Court ignores "this simple fact" and the lease relationship. 
Instead, it invokes equity to allow Wagner & Brown the opportunity to 
recoup costs it incurred while Sheppard's lease was in effect. 
2. Can Wagner & Brown Deduct Leasehold, Land/Legal, and Overhead 
Expenses? No 
As background for answering this question, the court reiterated these 
rules: "Expenditures involved in keeping the estate in production are 
reimbursable, though unsuccessful reworking operations are not-and 
reimbursement is to be pro-rata, out of the share in actual production."91 
The trial court had denied Wagner & Brown the right to deduct expenses 
it had labeled "leasehold," "land/legal," and "overhead."92 In upholding 
that ruling, the appellate court concluded that Wagner & Brown had not 
presented evidence needed "to show that the trial court wrongly decided 
the issue" and pointed to Wagner's failure to segregate the types of 
expenses or to show how they benefited the cotenancy.93 Under the Texas 
Supreme Court's view of the law and the evidence, however, Wagner & 
Brown escapes this ruling and earns a chance on remand to prove its right 
to deduct these expenses as reasonable and necessary costs. 94 
88. Pendley v. Byrom, 717 S.W.2d 602,605 (Tex. 1986). 
89. Hunt, 791 S.W.2d at 194. 
90. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d at 377. 
91. /d. at 378. 
92. /d. 
93. /d. at 380. 
94. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 430 (Tex. 2008). For a recent case 
distinguishing the Texas Supreme Court's ruling on these types of expenses, see BoMar Oil & 
Gas Inc. v. Loyd, No. 10-18-016-CV, 2009 WL 2136404, at *6 n.5 (Tex. App.-Waco Jul. 15, 
2009) (mem. op.) , modified, 298 S.W.3d 832 (Tex. App.- Waco 2009, no pet.) (appellate decision 
holding that Sheppard was not persuasive because Loyd, the non-joined cotenant protesting 
Bomar's accounting, "presented evidence that overhead fees were unreasonable and 
unnecessary"). This point raises another controversial issue in Sheppard: Which cotenant has the 
burden of proof regarding whether expenses are reasonable and necessary and, therefore, 
properly deductible? 
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3. Must Wagner & Brown Account To Sheppard on a Well-by-Well 
Basis? Yes 
Wagner & Brown claimed its accounting duties allowed it to account 
to Sheppard on an aggregate or tract basis, instead of on a well-by-well 
basis. In particular, Wagner & Brown sought to deduct expenses from an 
expensive workover on the Landers No. 1 well from revenues emanating 
from the No.2 well.95 In support of that argument, Wagner & Brown 
cited as authority the Hunt and Broadway cases discussed above. The 
court of appeals disagreed: "Neither Hunt nor Broadway stand for any 
proposition that is in conflict with the trial court's ruling in this case. "% 
Indeed, the review of those cases set forth above supports that 
conclusion. Yet in the end, Wagner & Brown prevails on this point under 
the Texas Supreme Court's initial determination that Sheppard's interest 
remained pooled and subject to accounting on a unit basis, even after her 
lease terminated.97 
F Summary of the Court of Appeals Opinion 
The court of appeals framed the issue in the case as: "Is Sheppard's 
Interest Still Subject to the Pooled Unit?" Because it was undisputed that 
her lease had terminated, the answer to that question was no: The lessee 
could pool no more than it owned-which was its fee simple 
determinable estate, not the lessor's possibility of reverter.98 After 
termination, the court noted that Sheppard's status changed from a lessor 
bound by lease terms to a non-joined cotenant.99 In light of Sheppard's 
new status, Wagner & Brown, as producing cotenant, owed duties to 
account to Sheppard on a net profits basis. Under those duties, Wagner & 
Brown could recoup expenses incurred after Sheppard's lease terminated, 
but not those incurred while it was in effect. Instead, while the lease was 
in effect, the terms of that contract governed.100 Even after termination, 
Wagner & Brown could recoup only reasonable and necessary expenses 
on a well-by-well basis, not on a tract or aggregate basis.101 
V. THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT OPINION: WAGNER & BROWN WINS IN 
A UNANIMOUS OPINION 
In support of its conclusions, the court of appeals recited textbook 
principles and honored the terms of the parties ' lease and the holdings of 
95. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d at 380. 
96. !d. at 381. 
97. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 430. 
98. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d at 374--77. 
99. ld. at 377. 
100. !d. at 377-80. 
101. !d. at 380-81. 
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long-standing cases. Understandably, that court omitted from its analysis 
any application of the MIP A. In fact, the appellate court only mentions 
that act in a footnote in which it notes as background that when leases are 
pooled under the MIP A by order of the railroad commission, terminated 
leases remain pooled as an unleased mineral interest. 102 This minimal 
mention of the MIPA is appropriate for one simple reason: Sheppard's 
interest was pooled under a lease pooling clause, not the MIP A. Yet 
reflecting an approach that permeates the entire decision, the opening 
paragraphs of the Texas Supreme Court's opinion mischaracterize the 
MIPA and the Texas unitization act-and misstate the core issue in the 
case. 
A. The Opening Paragraph: The Public Policy Goals of Pooling 
The court's opening paragraph reads as follows: 
One observer has estimated that 85 percent of the 27,000 wells 
drilled in the East Texas oil field in the first half of the 20th century 
were unnecessary-resulting in a huge waste of money and natural 
resources. As one means of reducing excessive drilling, the Texas 
Legislature provided for voluntary pooling in 1949, and compulsory 
pooling in 1965.103 
The court's choice to begin with this broad statement suggests that it 
relied at least in part on public policy to support its conclusions. Its 
reliance on public policy, however, is based on mistaken assumptions and 
fails to encourage an appropriate public policy solution through the 
legislature. First, regarding the MIPA-the 1965 act the court 
references-the legislature's reasons for finally passing that act were 
much narrower than the court suggests, and it is not truly "compulsory." 
As described by a respected treatise: 
The [MIPA] is not a carbon copy of any of the compulsory pooling 
acts that had long existed in other states. It is a unique act, forged by 
the legislature largely to protect small-tract owners and operators in 
the wake of the Normanna decision. Its legislative history has played 
a key role in the Texas Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation 
of the act. The courts have consistently construed MIPA as limited in 
function to protecting small-tract lessees rather than as a broad act 
designed to protect correlative rights generally, or as an act allowing 
large-tract lessees more flexibility in development.104 
102. !d. at 375 n.4. 
103. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 420-21 (Tex. 2008) (citations 
omitted). 
104. SMJTH & WEAVER, supra note 21, at 12-7. 
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In addition to its mistaken historical and substantive statements about 
Texas 's pooling statutes, there are other problems with the court's 
reliance on public policy to resolve the dispute in Sheppard. By praising 
pooling acts, the supreme court appears to suggest that Texas would 
benefit from a more comprehensive statute, a proposition with strong 
support among many in the oil and gas industry.105 That decision, 
however, rests with the legislature, not the courts. 106 Indeed, as Professor 
Jacqueline Weaver has argued, if Texas courts would decline "to bend 
the rules" to protect producers from lawsuits, the Texas legislature would 
be "forced to enact statutes which prevent the physical waste of oil and 
gas in Texas" by adopting compulsory rather than voluntary unitization 
d h . 1' 107 an a more compre ensrve poo mg statute. 
One of the cases Professor Weaver has criticized is Railroad 
Commission v. Manziel , a 1962 Texas Supreme Court case. 108 In Manziel 
the Whelans had unitized all of their leased properties but had no 
unitization agreement with the Manziels. The Whelans planned a 
secondary recovery waterflooding project, designed to recover nearly 
1 million barrels of oil. As part of this plan, the Railroad Commission had 
granted them a permit to inject water into a well that was closer to lease 
lines than permitted under field rules. The Manziels recognized that the 
injected water would spread radially and cross lease lines. 109 They sought 
to prevent this "trespass."110 The Texas Supreme Court denied them 
relief. Instead, it held that "[t]he technical rules of trespass have no place 
in the consideration of the validity of the orders of the Commission."111 
Professor Weaver assessed the effect of the court's ruling as follows: 
The court clearly believed that without a dispensation from trespass 
law, unit operators performing secondary recovery would be shut 
down by injunctions and billions of barrels of oil would remain 
unrecovered, locked in the reservoir rock forever. 
Really? Imagine for a minute that the court applied the orthodox 
rules of trespass law to this subsurface invasion of salt 
water .... Would the Texas legislature sit still for this sort of thing? 
Or might they then be forced to enact a compulsory unitization bill 
105. See, e.g., WEAVER, UNITIZATION, supra note 15, at 129-30 (discussing history that led 
to passage of the MIPA and its many limitations and concluding that those limitations "result in 
less pooling than would be desirable from an efficiency standpoint"). 
106. ld. at 128 (noting that the "[u]ltimate responsibility for compulsory pooling policy lay 
with the legislature"). 
107. Weaver, Politics, supra note 20, at 513 (criticizing the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in 
Railroad Comm'n v. Manziel , 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962)). 
108. 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962). 
109. !d. at 562-64. 
110. ld. at 566. 
111. /d. at 568-69. 
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that would put an end to the inefficient waterflooding patterns that 
persist in partially unitized fields. 112 
241 
In Sheppard the supreme court's opening paragraph foreshadows the 
very approach Professor Weaver criticized.113 While the Manziel opinion 
fails to rigidly apply common law rules of trespass to achieve a result that 
encouraged secondary recovery at least with a commission order in place, 
the Sheppard court goes further. It ignores the parties' contract and 
property law principles in an apparent attempt to promote pooling and 
protect existing pooled units, citing the MIPA as authority. 114 
Sheppard, however, does not involve a pooled unit created pursuant to 
the MIP A. Instead, the pooling occurred because of the parties' contract, 
and the terms of that contract-the oil and gas lease-should control 
rather than a broad policy goal of promoting pooling.115 Despite the 
parties' lease terms, in the end the court effectively force-pooled 
Sheppard's interest by deeming it an unleased mineral owner still subject 
to the unit, the very fact, as described above, the court of appeals noted in 
its background footnote as one possible scenario, but only when pooling 
actually occurs under the MIPA. 116 Because the Texas Supreme Court 
bent the rules, as Professor Weaver criticized, it has discouraged a 
legislative response. Instead, as described below, the court created 
uncertainty and encouraged litigation by ignoring plain terms in the 
parties' lease, resorting to equity, and reframing the issue in order to 
reach its result. 
B. The Court Reframes the Issue: "Does Termination of the Lease Also 
Terminate the Unit?" 
In the paragraph immediately following its public policy 
pronouncements, the court turns to the issue in the case and states, 
"Since [the 1949 and 1965 acts were passed], this Court has never 
112. Weaver, Politics, supra note 20, at 512; see also Burney, Pragmatic Approach, supra 
note 2, at 29 (noting the danger in leaving it to the legislature to pass needed statutes is that, as 
Professor Weaver recognized, politics between large producers and independents in Texas tend 
to "stalemate change"). 
113. See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 420-21 (Tex. 2008). 
114. See id. 
115. The author and other writers have encouraged courts to consider public policy goals 
when appropriate in formulating oil and gas jurisprudence, but writers have not suggested that 
public policy should override private contracts. In a recent decision, the Texas Supreme Court 
relied in part on public policy in holding that tracing did not constitute an actionable subsurface 
trespass. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). That case, 
however, involved interpretation of a court-created rule, the rule of capture-a rule courts 
crafted with public policy considerations in mind . Burney, Pragmatic Approach, supra note 2, at 
21 (reviewing cases and commentators approving of common law rule of capture as a principle 
that promotes public policy goals and balances interest of owners and producers). 
116. See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d 369, 375 n.4 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2006) , rev'd, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008)). 
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addressed how a pool of producing properties is affected if a lease in the 
pool expires."117 This sentence creates concern for two reasons: First, it 
seems to assume, incorrectly, that passage of those acts would affect the 
analysis of pooling under a lease pooling clause. Second, it misstates the 
issue in the case. After providing factual background for the case, the 
court restates the misstated issue as, "Does Termination of the Lease 
Also Terminate the Unit?"118 
However, unit termination is not the issue in Sheppard. Neither 
Sheppard nor any of the other owners in the Landers unit claimed that 
their leases or the unit had terminated. In fact, the leases from the owners 
of the other 7 /8ths interests in the Sheppard tract were maintained by 
production from the wells on that tract. That production also maintained 
other leases in the unit; therefore, there was no concern that the unit had 
terminated. The only issue before the court- as both lower courts 
recognized-was whether Sheppard's undivided 1/8th mineral interest 
remained pooled after her lease terminated according to the express 
terms of the royalty-payment provisions in Sheppard's lease. Regardless 
of these facts, the Texas Supreme Court in its decision begins by citing 
the MIP A, which was not involved in the case, and then addresses an 
issue that no one had raised. 
1. Has the Court Relied on Both the Lease and the Unit Agreement to 
Answer This Issue? 
In addressing this reframed issue, the court recognizes that lease 
language should control and sets forth Sheppard's pooling clause. Next, 
however, the court turns to the "Designation of Unit." Although the 
court acknowledges that this document was signed by the lessees, it 
proceeds to interpret "the documents" together to determine their impact 
on Sheppard's interest: 
But we agree that a proper interpretation of these documents 
indicates the termination of Sheppard's lease did not terminate her 
participation in the unit. A lease is not necessarily required for 
pooling; mineral owners can join a pool even if no lease exists. Here, 
both Sheppard's lease and the unit agreement pooled certain 
"premises" and "lands," not just their leased interests. Although 
Sheppard's lease expired, the lands themselves obviously did not. 
Thus, while termination of Sheppard's lease changed who owned the 
117. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 421. The court's references to "a pool of producing properties" 
and to whether "the pool expires" are misstatements. Lessees have the power to pool the leased 
properties into pooled units, not "pools." A pool is an "underground reservoir containing or 
appearing to contain a common accumulation of oil and natural gas." WILLIAMS & M EYERS, 
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 802 (10th ed. 1997). 
118. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 422. 
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mineral interests in the unit, it did not cause the unit to terminate 
because it was a pooling of lands, not just leases.119 
243 
In light of the court's references to "both documents," did it consider 
that although Sheppard had not signed the unit agreement she was bound 
by it? 120 This is just one of the myriad questions raised by this decision. 
The answer appears to be yes, a position at odds with previous decisions 
that recognize that lessors are not parties to unit agreements and are 
therefore not bound by their terms.121 Regardless of that fact, the court 
examines "both documents" to answer its reframed issue concerning 
whether the unit had terminated. Curiously, the first sentence quoted 
above acknowledges the real issue by mentioning Sheppard's 
"participation" in the unit. That first sentence states that "a proper 
interpretation of these documents indicates the termination of Sheppard's 
lease did not terminate her participation in the unit."122 Yet most of the 
opinion focuses on whether the unit had terminated.123 In fact, the court 
does not directly address the relevant issue again until the final paragraph 
of the whole opinion, where it concludes: "[T]ermination of Sheppard's 
lease did not terminate her participation in the Landers unit. "124 
2. The Ladd Decision Controls 
Before finally declaring that Sheppard's participation in the unit had 
not terminated, the court remained focused on whether the unit had 
terminated. As support for that conclusion, it relies on the Ladd 
decision,125 the same case the court of appeals determined was "far 
different" from Sheppard's case. 126 The supreme court, however, failed to 
recognize that the Ladd court interpreted a lease habendum clause, not a 
pooling clause, and in the process determined that the Blair lease had not 
terminated. Missing that point, the supreme court in Sheppard concluded, 
119. !d. at 422-23 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
120. Another odd sentence in this paragraph is the court's statement that a lease is not 
needed for pooling. See id. That may be true but there was a lease at issue in this case. 
121. See SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 21 , at 4-123 (discussing the Texas Supreme Court's 
opinion in Sheppard and noting that to the extent the opinion relied on language in the 
declaration of pooling it is at odds with Tittizer v. Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857 
(Tex. 2005)); see also Se. Pipeline Co. v. Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. 1999) ("A Lessee 
has no power to pool without the Lessor's express authorization, which is usually contained in 
the pooling clause."). 
122. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 422 (emphasis added). 
123. In the concluding section in which the court rejected the appellate court's conclusion 
that the pooling terminated when the lease terminated, the supreme court explained, "As 
termination of the lease changed none of the lands committed to the unit, we hold that it did not 
terminate the unit ." Jd. at 424. 
124. I d. at 430 (emphasis added). 
125. See id. at 422-23 ("On precisely this basis, the Second Court of Appeals held in [Ladd] 
that termination of a leas does not terminate a unit."). 
126. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d 369, 375 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006), 
rev'd, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008). 
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"In this case as in Ladd, lands as well as leases were pooled, so the tracts 
dedicated to the unit survived even if the related leases did not. "127 
Confident that Ladd controls, the supreme court dismissed the 
appellate court's treatment of that case, claiming these distinctions: 
The court of appeals here distinguished Ladd on the ground that it 
involved termination of an entire pool, while Sheppard seeks only 
termination of her participation in it. But there cannot be one rule 
on contract interpretation for small mineral interests and a different 
rule for large ones. If Sheppard's original interest had been 8/8ths 
rather than 118th, the ruling she seeks would have cut off all 
production for the other members in the pool just as occurred in 
Ladd.128 
However, the distinctions the court notes are not correct. Regarding 
the court's conclusion that "there cannot be one rule on contract 
interpretation for small mineral interests and a different rule for large 
ones," nowhere does the size of the interest figure into the analysis for 
the Ladd court or the court of appeals in Sheppard. Instead, both courts 
focused on lease language in the habendum and pooling clauses, 
respectively.129 Additionally, production was not "cut off" for the other 
members in the pooled unit in the Ladd case. Instead, production from 
the Woody lease maintained the Blair lease and the unit. 130 Similarly, 
even if Sheppard's original interest had been 8/8ths rather than 1/8th, as 
the court theorized, the ruling she sought would not "cut off" all 
production for the other members in the pool. Instead, the effect would 
be the same but the cotenancy accounting owed to her would change to 
reflect the larger size of her unleased interest. 
Admittedly, that hypothetical would burden the lessee who signed the 
unit agreement. 131 However, those are not the facts in Sheppard. 
Moreover, lessees in general avoid such hypothetical situations by 
complying with the terms of their leases. Indeed, had Sheppard's lessee 
complied with the royalty payment timeline in the lease and avoided its 
termination, her case would not be in the courts. But Sheppard's lessee 
admittedly allowed the lease to terminate. That fact raised an issue not 
127. Sheppard, 282 S.W.2d at 423. 
128. !d. (citations omitted). 
129. See Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d at 374; Ladd Petrol. Corp. v. Eagle Oil & Gas Co., 
695 S.W.2d 99, 101 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ refd n.r.e.). 
130. Ladd, 695 S.W.2d at 101. 
131. Under that hypothetical , since the wells are on Sheppard's tract , if she owned 100% of 
the tract, then her lessee would owe her a net profits accounting based on 100% of the 
production, even though that amount would exceed what that lessee had contracted to receive in 
the unit agreement. See supra Part IV.E (discussing lessees' accounting duties to interest owners 
in pooled units when lessees pool without authority from their lessors). 
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raised or analyzed in the Ladd decision. As one amicus accurately 
concluded, "[Ladd] is not applicable to the issue in this case."132 
C. "Just as pooling impinges on a mineral owner's royalty interest, it also 
may impinge on an owner's possibility of reverter." 
Addressing the actual issue in the case, the court of appeals concluded 
that because Sheppard's lessee had no power to pool her possibility of 
reverter, her interest was no longer subject to the pooled unit once her 
lease terminated. The Texas Supreme Court eventually addresses and 
rejects this conclusion: 
The court of appeals also reasoned from the premise that the 
pooling agreement transferred only the operator's interest, leaving 
Sheppard's possibility of reverter unimpinged. But her lease allowed 
pooling of "all or any part of the leased premises or interest therein, " 
and Sheppard's reverter was certainly an interest in the leased 
premises .. .. Just as pooling impinges on a mineral owner's royalty 
interest, it also may impinge on an owner's possibility of reverter.133 
This paragraph requires careful deconstruction. First, as some of the 
amicus writers wondered, Why did the court choose the word "impinged" 
for its analysis rather than a more traditional property-law concept?134 
Impinged means "to affect."135 Under that definition, the court is correct 
that pooling impinges on the lessor's royalty interest. Specifically, as 
noted above, pooling affects the royalty-calculation formula by changing 
it from tract-based to unit-based. Pooling, however, does not convey the 
royalty interest; it merely changes the lessee's contractual obligation 
regarding royalty payments. The correct question- as the court of 
appeals framed it-is whether the lease pooling clause conveys the 
lessor's possibility of reverter. 
The answer to that question is no. The supreme court misread the 
lease when it concluded the lessor's possibility of reverter is "an interest 
in the leased premises. "136 A plain reading of the lease dismantles that 
132. Reply Brief of Dick Watt, supra note 35, at 6; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Dick 
Watt at 12, Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (No. 06-0845), 2009 WL 301287. Amicus brief writers 
formulated their own hypotheticals to demonstrate the myriad problems with the supreme 
court's opinion. See discussion infra Part VI questioning the opinion's effect on depth severance 
provisions and whether the court has overruled Superior Oil Co. v. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d 276 
(Tex. 1966). 
133. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 423-24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
134. One amicus brief writer was particularly perplexed by the court's use of "impinged" to 
analyze the issue. See Amicus Curiae Brief of George A. Snell, III at 6, Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 
419 (No. 06-0845), 2009 WL 761112 ("In a property law context, Amicus is familiar with the 
concepts of owning and managing property. Amicus is not familiar with the property concept of 
'impinging.'"). 
135. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICfiONARY 624 (11th ed. 2003). 
136. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 423. 
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view. The granting clause of the lease conveys to the lessee "the following 
described land, hereinafter called leased premises." That phrase is defined 
by the property description of the land that follows (64.4 acres of the 
Hooper Survey) and the purpose clause, clarifying that only the mineral 
estate, not the surface, has been conveyed. Noting that the court ignored 
the proper definition of "leased premises" as it appears in the granting 
clause, amici described the interpretative conclusion required under the 
supreme court's view of the possibility of reverter as "certainly an interest 
in the leased premises." Under that view, because the granting clause 
conveys and includes "the leased premises," the lessor would have 
conveyed her entire estate to the lessee. 137 
However, Sheppard's lease clarifies the meaning of the phrase "leased 
premises." The second paragraph-the habendum clause-defines the 
term of the lease and the duration of the lessee's estate as enduring "for 
as long thereafter as oil or gas or other substances" are produced from 
the leased premises. As explained above, the "so long as" phrase creates 
not a fee simple absolute, but a fee simple determinable estate in the 
lessee. By operation of law, having conveyed less than her fee simple 
absolute estate in the property, the grantor-lessor retains a non-
possessory estate- a possibility of reverter- that automatically becomes 
possessory when the lease terminates.138 Contrary to the court's 
conclusion, the possibility of reverter is separate from, not an interest in, 
the "leased premises." 139 
Prior to lease termination, the lessee maintains its separate fee simple 
determinable estate but cannot convey or create by contract an interest 
greater than it owns. Similarly, although the lessee has the contractual 
right to pool the "leased premises" (all or part of the property described 
in the granting clause), the estate the lessee can pool is its fee simple 
determinable interest-nothing more.140 
To analyze this point using language appearing in the supreme court's 
opinion, pooling cannot "impinge" on the lessor-owner's possibility of 
reverter unless that lessor-owner has agreed that pooling will endure 
after the lease has terminated. No such language appears in the Sheppard 
137. See, e.g. , Amicus Curiae Brief of Dick Watt, supra note 132, at 6. 
138. To avoid confusion, a possibility of reverter should be distinguished from other 
"reversionary" interests, a distinction that the Texas Supreme Court failed to make in its 
decision . Specifically, the Texas Supreme Court in Sheppard cited cases involving irrelevant 
reversionary interests, including Mengden v. Peninsula Prod. Co. , 544 S.W.2d 643 (1976) 
(involving reversionary interests created in farm-out agreements) and Southland Royalty Co. v. 
Humble Oil & Refining Co., 151 Tex. 324, 249 S.W.2d 914 (1952) (construing term mineral deed 
that would revert at end of term unless term maintained by a community lease). Sheppard, 282 
S.W.3d at 423-24; see also Amicus Curiae Brief of Dick Watt, supra note 132, at 8-11 (explaining 
that the reversionary interest cases "do not support the Opinion"). 
139. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
140. See discussion supra Part IV.D. 
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lease or in any standard oil and gas lease. Because lessors do not sign 
lessees ' pooling or unit agreements, they are not bound by those 
contracts. Instead, the pooling power merely grants the lessee authority 
to pool its fee simple determinable estate and change its royalty 
obligation without seeking the lessor's prior approval. Unlike the Texas 
Supreme Court, the court of appeals in Sheppard understood this purpose 
and the accepted principle that a standard lease pooling clause does not 
grant the lessee the power to pool the lessor's possibility of reverter. 
Therefore, when the lease ends, the lessor's interest is no longer subject 
h 1 d . 141 tot e poo e urut. 
In addition to contradicting the view of the court of appeals, amicus 
brief writers, and other attorneys on this point, the Texas Supreme Court 
discounted the view of oil and gas treatises. Specifically, the court noted 
that "Sheppard urges adoption of a treatise's view that 'pooling can 
extend no longer than the lease itself' because a lessor grants only 'a 
power to pool the leasehold rights."' 142 In declining to adopt that view, the 
court ironically stressed that pooling clauses are "a matter of contract." 143 
After that statement, the court returned to its reframed issue (whether 
the unit had terminated) and again suggested that both "documents" (the 
lease and the unit agreement) support its decision: 
If the parties want pooling to expire (or not) upon termination of 
one lease, they should be free to say so. The lease here allowed the 
Sheppard tract (rather than just the lease) to be pooled for purposes 
of production, and that is what the unit designation did. As 
termination of the lease changed none of the lands committed to the 
unit, we hold that it did not terminate the unit.144 
After rejecting the prevailing view that a standard lease pooling clause 
does not allow a lessee to pool the lessor's possibility of reverter, the 
court turned to the cotenant accounting claims. In addressing these 
issues, the court again retreated from settled principles. 
141. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d 369, 374-77 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 
2006), rev'd, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008); see also discussion supra Part IV.A. 
142. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 424. The treatises cited to the court were 1 BRUCE M. 
KRAMER &PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING & UNITIZATION§ 15.04 (3d. ed. 2006) 
and 6-9 PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS 
LAW,§ 931.2 (2007). 
143. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 424. 
144. !d. (citations omitted). 
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D. Cotenant Accounting: Wagner & Brown Wins 
1. Equity Trumps Lease Terms: Sheppard May Be Liable for Drilling 
Costs Incurred Before Her Lease Terminated 
As the supreme court notes, its determination that "the unit did not 
terminate" resolved most of the accounting issues in Wagner & Brown's 
favor. 145 Specifically, the court held that "Wagner & Brown properly 
accounted to Sheppard for both production and expenses on a unit 
basis."146 As for the overhead, landman, and other expenses that both 
lower courts had ruled were improper, the supreme court instead 
reversed and remanded and instructed the trial court to consider whether 
those costs were reasonable and necessary.147 
On another accounting issue, however, the court reached a conclusion 
that-in addition to its ruling that pooling extends beyond the life of the 
lease-provoked the flurry of amicus curiae briefs: its determination that 
equitable considerations allowed Wagner & Brown an opportunity to 
recover costs incurred even while Sheppard's lease was in effect. 148 
Because the second well was drilled after her lease terminated, Sheppard 
recognized that her interest would be charged with her proportionate 
share of those reasonable and necessary drilling costs. The dispute 
therefore concerned the drilling costs of the first well, which was 
completed in October 1996, approximately five months before her lease 
terminated.149 
To support its conclusion on this point-a point the court of appeals 
considered "simple,"150 -the Texas Supreme Court undertook a broad 
search for authority but minimized oil and gas cases that have interpreted 
this exact question. At one point the court even discussed the doctrine of 
substantial performance, a doctrine applied to building contracts: "It is 
true that [Sheppard's lessee] breached Sheppard's lease, but a breaching 
party is not necessarily barred from reimbursement for improvements. 
For example, Texas law permits recovery to builders upon substantial 
performance, even if they have breached their building contract."151 
145. ld. 
146. /d. at 424-25. 
147. /d. The court decided to remand having concluded: "At trial, Sheppard produced no 
evidence that any of these expenses were not reasonable and necessary; to the contrary, she 
stipulated that many of them were." /d. at 425. The parties did not appeal the court of appeals' 
conclusion that Wagner & Brown could not deduct expenses incurred from the first well from 
the revenues for the second well . /d. at 425 n.24. 
148. !d. at 427. 
149. /d. at 421-22. 
150. See Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 198 S.W.3d 369, 377 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 
2006), rev 'd , 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008). 
151. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 427. 
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Primarily, however, the court relied on "the general rule regarding 
improvements."152 Rather than rely on Byrom or Hunt-cases involving 
oil and gas law-the court quoted from a case that determined purchasers 
of lots in a real estate development were not good faith improvers: "The 
principle is well established in equity that a person who in good faith 
makes improvements upon property owned by another is entitled to 
compensation therefore."153 Continuing, the court stated, "As oil and gas 
wells are improvements to real property, the same rule applies to them: 
one who drills a well in good faith is entitled to reimbursement." 154 
Indeed, as noted in the discussion of Byrom above, the rules for good 
faith improvers or trespassers mirror those imposed on cotenants who 
produce from the co-owned property. That is, the producing cotenant, 
like the good faith trespasser, may recoup reasonable and necessary 
expenses before accounting to the other owners. Those rules, however, 
do not apply between lessors and lessees. Instead, their lease controls. 
Rather than rely on the terms of Sheppard's valid lease, the court cites 
good faith improver cases that involve drillers who entered the property 
under invalid leases. 155 In Sheppard, however, the parties agreed 
Sheppard's lease was valid and terminated according to its own terms.156 
But these factual distinctions do not concern the court. Instead, the court 
reasons that since these improver rules would be available if "she signed 
no lease at all," they should be available when there is "a valid lease that 
was mistakenly allowed to expire" because "it is hard to see why one who 
obtains a lease and then loses it by mistake is entitled to less equity than 
one who by mistake never had a valid lease in the first place. "157 
Prior to this case, however, the rule that a lessee cannot recover for 
drilling costs while the lease was in effect was not "hard to see." In fact, 
that rule, like the pooling issue as resolved by the court of appeals, is 
textbook law. Lessors do not bear the burden of production costs while 
the lease is in effect; while the lease is in effect the lessee is not a 
trespasser or a good faith improver.158 Rather, the lessee has a contractual 
152. I d. at 425. 
153. I d. at 425 & n.28 (citing Sharp v. Stacy, 535 S.W.2d 345, 351 (Tex. 1976)). 
154. I d. at 426 (citations omitted). 
155. ld. at 426 nn.35-36 (citing Brannon v. Gulf States Energy Corp., 562 S.W.2d 219, 224 
(Tex. 1977) and Texas Co. v. State, 154 Tex. 494, 281 S.W.2d 83, 93 (1955), and noting both 
involved invalid leases). 
156. See Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 421-22. 
157. ld. at 427. 
158. Although states consistently interpret standard oil and gas leases as relieving the lessor 
of the duty to pay production costs while a lease is in effect, jurisdictions have reached different 
conclusions regarding the allocation of post-production costs between lessees and lessors. Texas 
has determined that a lessor must bear his proportionate share of post-production costs when 
the royalty clause uses the "market value at the well" valuation standard. Heritage Res., Inc. v. 
NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996) (holding that the literal language of the royalty clause 
required this interpretation); accord Owen L. Anderson, Royalty Valuation: Should Royalty 
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relationship with the lessor-owner, and the terms of that contract-the 
lease-control. Those terms guarantee the lessor a cost-free landowner's 
royalty, one free of the costs of production.159 Therefore, even if the costs 
meet the reasonableness requirement imposed under the net profits 
accounting standard, "they cannot be deducted if not incurred during the 
trespass. "160 
Prior to the Sheppard decision, attorneys, casebook authors, and courts 
had well understood the effect of a valid oil and gas lease on good faith 
trespasser accounting rules. In Hunt v. HNG Oil Co., discussed above, as 
in Sheppard, a lessee entered the land under a valid lease that later 
terminated. After termination the lessee plugged back a dry-hole well to 
a shallower formation and began producing.161 Under those facts, the 
lessee was considered a good faith producer, a status that spared it from 
forfeiting all costs.162 As a good faith trespasser, the lessee was entitled to 
recover only those costs incurred after the lease terminated. As the court 
explained, "HNG did not become a good faith trespasser until after the 
initial drilling of the well; therefore, it is not entitled to reimbursement 
for this improvement made prior to the expiration of the lease. "163 
The Texas Supreme Court acknowledges the Hunt decision but 
decides to dismiss it on a mistaken basis. According to the court, the Hunt 
opinion misread the Broadway v. Stone case, also discussed above, by 
failing to notice that Broadway permitted recovery of costs incurred 
before the owner purchased the property.164 However, the expenses the 
court awarded in Broadway were incurred after the purchase, not 
before.165 That determination supports the conclusion reached by the 
Hunt court. Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court in Sheppard misread 
Broadway v. Stone-the Hunt appellate court did not. 166 
Obligations Be Determined Intrinsically, Theoretically, or Realistically?, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 
547 (1997). 
159. LOWE, NUTSHELL, supra note 23, at 278. 
160. LOWE ET AL. , CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 23, at 103 (citing Hunt v. HNG Oil 
Co., 791 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied)) . 
161. Hunt, 791 S.W.2d at 192. 
162. !d. at 193-94. A bad faith trespasser has no right to seek reimbursement from the 
owner. See LOWE, ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 23, at 101. 
163. Hunt, 791 S.W.2d at 193-94. 
164. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 428 n.51 (Tex. 2008). 
165. Broadway v. Stone, 15 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved). 
166. See discussion of Broadway supra Part IV.E; see also Amicus Brief of Tri-C Resources, 
Inc. at 11-12, Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (No. 06-0845) (describing how the supreme court in 
Sheppard improperly dismissed the Hunt opinion). In addition to dismissing Hunt, the supreme 
court cites a case the Hunt court found distinguishable, Thoreson v. Fox, 390 S.W.2d 308, 317 
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 398 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1966). This case, 
unlike Broadway, involved a terminated oil and gas lease and, under limited facts, suggested that 
pre-termination costs can be recovered. See Thoreson, 390 S.W.2d at 308. In another example of 
the court's misuse of authority, in its preface to discussing that case, the supreme court in 
Sheppard concludes it is not "convincing." Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 427. In other words, both the 
Hunt court and the Texas Supreme Court in Sheppard found Thoreson unconvincing. However, 
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Having disposed of Hunt and cases it cited as binding precedent, the 
court in Sheppard concludes as follows: 
One cannot conclude much from this limited set of cases, except 
that operators apparently do not let many productive leases expire 
before recovering their drilling costs. Given the equitable nature of a 
reimbursement-for-improvements claim, we decline to read Texas 
law as establishing that drilling costs are always or never recoverable 
when a lease expires. 
Instead, we believe the equitable nature of such claims must turn 
on the equities in each case. Thus, for example, an operator who 
intentionally terminates a lease has a weaker claim to equity than 
one who does so by accident. ... As with other equitable actions, a 
jury may have to settle disputed issues about what happened . .. . 167 
With that determination, the court reversed and remanded for a new 
trial and consideration of whether Wagner & Brown is entitled to 
"equitable recovery" for costs incurred before Sheppard's lease 
terminated.168 Therefore, after Sheppard, lessees have reason to seek a 
jury determination that lease termination was "mistaken." Although that 
determination apparently will not prevent the lease from terminating, it 
could allow the lessee to recover costs incurred while the lease was in 
effect, despite the plain terms of the lease. 
VI. WHAT HATH WAGNER & BROWN V. SHEPPARD WROUGHT? 
Ironically, the Texas Supreme Court previously had championed 
certainty as a worthy public policy goal, particularly regarding issues 
affecting mineral titles.169 Yet Sheppard's disregard for the plain language 
the supreme court rejects the conclusion in Hunt that a producer cannot recoup costs incurred 
before the lease terminated, while at the same time agrees that Thoreson , which allowed pre-
termination recoupment, was unconvincing. Hunt, 791 S.W.2d at 194 n.2. The Hunt court noted 
Thoreson in a footnote as one of two Amarillo court of appeals decisions addressing the issue, 
with Thoreson allowing costs and the other declining to do so. ld. For that reason, the Hunt 
court considered the Broadway case as better authority because it had "at least some approval of 
the Supreme Court." Hunt, 791 S.W.2d at 194. 
167. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 428. 
168. ld. at 430. Texas cases have allowed lessees to rely on equity to prevent their leases 
from terminating due to late payment of delay rentals. See, e.g. , Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. 
Harrison , 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 355 (1947) (holding lessor was estopped from claiming lease 
terminated when lessee made partial delay rental payment based on mistaken title information). 
For a discussion of these cases, see LOWE, NUTSHELL, supra note 23, at 218 (noting that despite 
determinable nature of delay rental clause, some cases invoke equity but "reach their pleasing 
but illogical results with little reasoning"). 
169. See Laura H. Burney, The Regrettable Rebirth of the Two-Grant Doctrine in Texas Deed 
Construction , 34 S. TEX. L. REv. 73, 81 (1993) (discussing Texas Supreme Court cases, such as 
Moser v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984) and Altman v. Blake, 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 
1986), as cases in which the court recognized the need for stability and certainty in the 
construction of mineral conveyances) . Oil and gas law scholars have long championed the need 
for certainty to encourage production and ensure efficiency: "In matters of land titles, and most 
certainly in the field of oil and gas where heavy expenditures of capital are incident to 
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of the lease and for the opinions in treatises, amicus curiae briefs, and 
prior court decisions-plus its reliance on equity-inject unprecedented 
uncertainty into oil and gas jurisprudence. Some of the particular legal 
questions looming are considered below, as well as suggestions for 
dealing with the aftermath of the Sheppard decision. 
A. Title and Accounting Issues 
In asking the Texas Supreme Court to reconsider its opinion, amicus 
curiae briefs pointed to several questions raised by the opinion. 
1. What Does Sheppard Own After Her Lease Terminates? 
Since the court held that the lease terminated but remained subject to 
the pooled unit, does that mean Sheppard can only lease a pooled 
interest? Under the basic notion (one the court basically ignored)- that 
one can convey no more than she owns- the answer should be yes, 
Sheppard can only lease a pooled interest. The next question is, On what 
terms? Do the unit agreement's terms control since the court relied on it 
in its analysis, even though Sheppard never signed it? One question leads 
to another and only one fact is certain: After Sheppard, much is 
uncertain, and this lack of certainty will lead to more litigation over new 
questions raised by that case and over lease provisions and practices 
previously considered beyond question. 
2. Would the Sheppard Rule Apply If the Wells Had Been Off Her 
Tract? 
Several amici raised this question and noted tension with previous 
supreme court decisions, particularly Superior Oil Co. v. Roberts.170 That 
case held that an unleased mineral owner whose interest was within the 
geographical boundaries of a pooled unit-but who had no contractual 
agreement with the parties-was not allowed to join the unit and obtain 
benefits of production from a well off his tract. 171 As amicus writers 
exploration, development and production, certainty is of the utmost importance." Eugene 
Kuntz, The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in Wyoming, 3 WYO. L.J. 107, 114 (1949). 
170. 398 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1966). 
171. !d. at 278. "A unitization agreement does not effect a merger of title of the tracts 
involved so as to give a cotenant of a separate tract, who refuses to sign the lease of his tract or 
the agreement, an interest as a cotenant in the other tracts of land." 3 SUMMERS OIL AND GAS 
(3d ed. 2009) 492 § 612. Such an owner does not automatically have the right to ratify the unit 
and benefit from production off his tract. See Fletcher v. Ricks, 905 F.2d 890, 892 (5th Cir. 1990) 
("We decline to hold that the mere preparation and filing of a unit designation constitutes an 
offer to all persons who hold leases on land within the designated acreage to join in the unit. "). 
Instead, whether the unpooled, non-drill site owner has the right to ratify may be based on 
whether he received an offer to ratify from the operator of the unit. Roberts, 398 S.W.2d at 278. 
Contrast the treatment of unpooled, non-drill site mineral owners with that of non-participating 
royalty interest owners ("NPRI"). See Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210 (Tex. 1968) 
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questioned, If Sheppard's interest had been in a non-drill site tract in the 
unit, and the lessee failed to meet the requirements of the royalty-
payment timeline, would the court allow Sheppard to recover her 
cotenancy share of production from that well? 
Although the answer could be yes under the court's analysis, that 
conclusion contradicts Roberts. If the court intended that result, amici 
urged it to at least clarify that point on rehearing. 172 Since the court 
declined to do so, the viability of Roberts is unclear. Roberts could be 
distinguished on the ground that the mineral owner there never had a 
lease with the operator, unlike Sheppard. However, if Roberts has not 
been affected by the Sheppard opinion, and non-drill site mineral owners 
are barred from joining the unit, then as another writer noted, the court's 
ruling that "'a unit designation is not affected by the termination of a 
lease' applies only when it is to the advantage of the lessee to do so."173 
3. How Does the Ruling Affect Depth Severance Clauses? 
Several amici asked the court to address this issue on rehearing, giving 
detailed factual examples of the problems posed by the opinion.174 This 
example illustrates the concerns: Most leases contain clauses that 
terminate automatically as to certain depths. 175 Assume that a lease in a 
pooled unit terminated as to certain depths and a new lessee takes a lease 
on these deeper formations and drills a producing well. Under Sheppard, 
(holding that pooling is not binding on NPRI without obtaining consent); see generally LOWE ET 
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 23, at 710 (describing case holdings that executive 
cannot pool NPRI without consent and allowing NPRI to accept offer to pool when well is off 
his tract, or reject that offer when well is on his tract) . 
172. Amicus Curiae Brief of Ernest V. Bruchez at 6, Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (No. 06-
0845). Mr. Bruchez-who is a former chair of the Oil, Gas, and Energy Resources Law Council 
of the State Bar of Texas-states: 
The Opinion is patently unfair to mineral owners whose leases have terminated 
(either partially or fully) on non-drill-site tracts unless the Court overrules Superior v. 
Roberts. If the Court does not withdraw the Opinion and does not overrule Superior v. 
Roberts, a lessee would have no incentive whatsoever to offer to purchase a new lease 
on the terminated rights because the lessee could produce, sell and keep 100% of tbe 
proceeds from production attributable to the previously leased and now unleased 
interest. If the Court intends to overrule Superior v. Roberts the Court should do so in 
clear terms in a revised opinion. 
/d. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
173. Amicus Curiae Brief of William M. Huffman, P.C. and Abney & Warwick in Support of 
Respondent 's Motion for Rehearing at 21, Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (No. 06-0845) [hereinafter 
Amicus Curiae Brief of Huffman and Abney Warwick] , available at http://www.supreme.courts. 
state. tx. us/ebriefs/06/06084507 .pdf. 
174. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Herbert W. Henry, supra note 51; Amicus Curiae Brief of 
Huffman and Abney & Warwick, supra note 173; Amicus Curiae Brief of George A, Snell, III, 
supra note 134. 
175. A typical depth severance clause reads that "upon expiration of the primary term or 
cessation of continuous drilling or reworking operations, this lease terminates as to all depths 
more than 100 feet below the deepest depth drilled on the land described herein or other land 
pooled therewith." 
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are those depths still subject to the prior unit, meaning all interest owners 
in that unit now share in the well producing from depths expressly 
released under the first lease? Under the court's logic, the answer could 
be yes. Because the depths remained pooled under the Sheppard rule, the 
second lessee could only lease pooled acreage. 
4. Have Old Units Previously Considered Terminated Been 
Resurrected? 
As revealed by the depth-severance example, if termination as to 
depths does not terminate the lease as to those terminated horizons, then 
units previously thought to have partially terminated may be resurrected 
as to those depths. Indeed, under the court's strained analysis one could 
argue that units in which all leases had previously terminated have been 
entirely resurrected. The court consistently focused on "both documents" 
in determining whether Sheppard's interest remained pooled. Those 
documents are the lease and the unit agreement, which the court noted 
allowed for pooling "lands" not just leases. Seizing on the reference to 
"lands," the court justified its conclusion that Sheppard's interest 
remained pooled because even though her lease terminated, "the lands 
themselves obviously did not."176 In light of that obvious but irrelevant 
conclusion, coupled with the court 's apparent view that lessors are bound 
by unit agreements, it follows that unless a unit has terminated according 
to its express terms, it has not terminated-even if the leases have. 
In its response to Sheppard's Motion for Rehearing, Wagner & Brown 
assured the court that its "opinion will not resuscitate units previously 
believed to have terminated."177 In support of that conclusion, Wagner & 
Brown explained, "The only reasonable inference from the opinion, then, 
is that termination of a unit depends on the language that the parties 
chose to include in the unit agreement and lease pooling clause. "178 But 
that explanation provides little comfort. Instead, as explained in amicus 
curiae briefs, this "resurrection of units" concern is valid for at least two 
reasons. One is that unit agreements, like pooling clauses, often fail to 
expressly state when a unit will terminate, which was the case in the 
Sheppard unit agreement. 179 A second is the industry practice of rarely 
filing documents to formally terminate units, even when lease pooling 
clauses, like Sheppard's, provide that a lessee "may" do so.180 
176. See Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d at 423. 
177. Petitioners' Response to Motion for Rehearing, supra note 35, at 11. 
178. ld. at 12. 
179. Amicus Curiae Brief of Herbert W. Henry, supra note 51 , at 5 (noting that he found no 
language in the Landers Unit agreement that "requires or assures the ultimate termination of 
the pooled unit"). 
180. !d. at 6-7. 
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After Sheppard, inserting express termination language in unit 
agreements and filing formal termination documents must become 
industry practice to counter the court's conclusion that-although the 
leases terminated-the "lands" and therefore the units have not.181 
Absent such determinative documents and language, however, the 
question remains whether under Sheppard units endure even after all 
leases have terminated. 
According to Wagner & Brown, "Nowhere did the Court hold that a 
unit survives both cessation of production and termination of all of its 
constituent leases. "182 It is true that the court did not address the effect of 
cessation of production and termination of all the leases on the Landers 
unit. Those were not the facts in Sheppard. But the facts did not prevent 
the court from addressing an issue not raised: whether the unit had 
terminated. In addressing that reframed issue, as described above, the 
court chose to focus on language in the lease and unit agreement and 
concluded that since the lands had not terminated, the unit had not. And 
since, as the court accurately notes, "lands" do not terminate, it follows 
from this flawed analysis that the unit would not terminate, even if the 
leases have terminated. That result contradicts case law and industry 
custom and practice, but as an impressive number of amicus writers 
informed the court, so did its Sheppard opinion.183 
181. Amicus writer Herbert W. Henry suggests that pooled unit designations contain 
detailed provisions limiting the term of the pool, such as similar language found in joint 
operating agreements. Other suggestions are that " [a]ttorneys representing lessors should be 
educated as to the advisability of requesting such formal dissolutions of units when lease releases 
are requested. " Email from Herbert W. Henry to Laura H. Burney (June 18, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
182. Petitioners ' Response to Motion for Rehearing, supra note 35, at'11. 
183. In an effort to determine whether and when units terminate under Sheppard's flawed 
reasoning, one amicus writer asked: 
If unit declarations do not terminate (become ineffective as to a lease) when the lease 
terminates, when does a unit declaration terminate? Is it logical or reasonable to 
conclude "pooling terminates as to all tracts in a unit when the last lease covering land 
in the unit terminates" but "termination of a lease does not terminate a pooling 
agreement as to the lessor's interest in a terminated lease unless it is the last lease to 
terminate?" 
Amicus Curiae Brief of Huffman and Abney & Warwick, supra note 173, at 14. 
Another amicus writer suggests that by analogizing to rules governing powers of attorney, 
and stressing the goals of pooling for efficient production of the land, units should terminate 
when production has ceased within the unit, which is the current assumption in the industry. 
Proposal submitted by Herbert W. Henry (available upon request from Mr. Henry). However, as 
the author describes in Part liLA., supra, in her opinion the pooling authority should be viewed 
as creating contractual rights, not as a power of attorney. Another point that could be persuasive 
with the court, since it cited the MIP A in its opening paragraph, is the provision in the MIP A 
that units terminate six months after cessation of production from a unit. See MIP A, TEX. NAT. 
RES. CODE ANN.§ 102.082(3) (Vernon 2001 & Supp. 2009). 
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5. Is the Sheppard Opinion Limited to the Sheppard Facts? 
Because none of the Texas Supreme Court justices dissented in 
Sheppard, odds are it will never be overruled.184 Practitioners' primary 
hope, then, is that the decision is limited to its facts. Yet questions remain 
about the opinion's reach. For example, Does the Sheppard rule that a 
pooling clause allows the lessee to pool the lessor's possibility of reverter 
apply only to the language appearing in Sheppard's lease, the reference 
to "leased premises or interest therein?" That limitation would exempt 
from Sheppard's shadow common pooling clauses, such as those giving 
the lessee the "power to voluntarily pool or combine the lands covered by 
this Lease, or any portion thereof."185 However, that limited view of 
Sheppard's effect is precarious. In one section, the opinion quotes and 
analyzes the particular phrase from Sheppard's lease. However, for the 
most part it sweeps broadly and loosely relying not just on its 
interpretation of the lease pooling language, but on the unit agreement, 
public policy, irrelevant or misconstrued cases, and equitable 
considerations. 
Even if the opinion is limited to the language in Sheppard's lease, as 
one leading treatise suggests, that reading has far-reaching effects since 
similar language appears in thousands of leases. Therefore, as Professors 
Smith and Weaver describe: 
[T]he decision raises the possibility that tens of thousands of mineral 
acres that were pooled under leases executed over the last 70 years 
or more remain pooled even though the leases on those interests 
have long since terminated. If this is, indeed, the case, it raises the 
possibility that large numbers of title opinions are erroneous; 
landowners executing new leases on land subject to pooling have 
breached general warranties of title in their leases, and oil and gas 
companies that have taken such leases may have improperly 
purported to pool interests that are still within pooled units, may 
have incurred liability to owners of adjacent tracts, and may be 
subject to claims of slander of title.186 
Another question about Sheppard's reach is whether the court's 
reliance on equity applies to a broad range of lease termination and 
accounting facts, or only to those presented in the case. One arguing for a 
broad application would point to the court's sweeping conclusion that 
184. The author of the court's opinion, Justice Scott Brister, has announced he will resign 
and return to private practice. Another justice, Justice Harriet O 'Neill , who joined in the 
opinion, has also announced she will leave the court. Justice Don Willett, who remains with the 
court, did not participate in the Sheppard decision. 
185. This pooling clause appears in LOWE, NUTSHELL, supra note 23, at 242 (emphasis 
added) . 
186. SMITH & WEAVER, supra note 21, at 4-123. 
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"we decline to read Texas law as establishing that drilling costs are always 
or never recoverable when a lease expires. "187 Even if viewed as a narrow 
exception available only to lessees who "mistakenly" fail to comply with 
royalty payment timelines in their leases, that exception encourages 
litigation and stands as a stark departure from the Texas Supreme Court's 
previous approach to lease interpretation, the plain meaning doctrine. 
B. Does Sheppard Represent the Demise of the Plain Meaning Approach 
to Lease Interpretation? 
1. Background: Texas Courts and the Plain Meaning Approach to 
Interpreting Oil and Gas Lease Clauses 
Writers refer to the plain meaning approach to describe a jurisdiction's 
interpretative view, particularly regarding the meaning of the gas royalty 
clause in an oil and gas lease. That clause created unique interpretative 
problems in the 1970s and 1980s when market forces caused prevailing 
"market values" of gas to exceed the values lessees were receiving under 
their long-term contracts for that gas. Lessors argued that since their 
leases required lessees to base royalties on the "market value at the well" 
of the gas produced from their lands, the lessees should base royalties on 
the higher values. Lessees responded that because they entered into their 
long-term contracts in good faith, the values they were receiving under 
those contracts should serve as the basis for calculating royalties. As 
courts from various jurisdictions began resolving these controversies, they 
adopted one of two general approaches. Courts following a cooperative 
venture approach favored lessees at the time by considering marketing 
realities extant at the time the lessees committed the gas to long-term 
contracts. Under the plain meaning approach, courts viewed the lease 
language as unambiguous and declined to consider outside factors. 188 
Texas adopted the plain meaning approach to the "market value 
royalty" interpretative issue in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela. 189 In Vela, a 
1968 decision, the Texas Supreme Court held that the "market value" 
royalty valuation requirement in a lease required the lessee to base 
royalties on the price of gas in the open market, even though the gas had 
1 190 actually been sold for less under the lessee's long-terms sa es contracts. 
187. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419,428 (Tex. 2008). 
188. JohnS. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation , 49 SMU L. REV., 223, 233-36 (1996). An 
impressive number of articles have addressed and analyzed the "market value royalty" cases. 
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 158, at 549; John Burritt McArthur, The Precedent Trap and the 
Irrational Persistence of the Vela Rule, 39 Hous. L. REv. 982 (2002); David E. Pierce, Exploring 
the Jurisprudential Underpinning of the Implied Covenant to Market, 48 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. 
INST. 10-1 (2002). 
189. 429 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. 1968). 
190. !d. at 871. 
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In other words, the Vela court enforced the plain terms of the lease, even 
though that interpretation burdened lessees by requiring them to base 
royalties on amounts higher than those they received from their gas 
purchasers. 
The court reaffirmed Vela in a 1981 case, Exxon Corp. v. Middleton. 191 
As in Vela, the increase in market values of gas placed a financial burden 
on the lessees. Yet the court refused "to disregard the plain and 
unambiguous terms of the royalty clause."192 
In 2001 the Texas Supreme Court faced the reverse-Vela problem in 
Y zaguirre v. KCS Resources, Inc. 193 In that case, the lessors claimed 
lessees should base royalties on their contract prices, which were higher 
than the prevailing market value of gas. In ruling in favor of the lessees, 
the court again pledged its allegiance to the plain meaning approach: 
Because the Vela lease's plain terms specified a market price royalty, 
we rejected the lessee's argument that "the market price of gas 
within the meaning of the lease is the price contracted for in good 
faith by the lessee in pursuance of its duty to market gas from the 
premises." Instead, we held that the plain terms of the lease required 
the lessee to pay a market-value royalty even though the lessee 
received less than market value under its long-term sales contract. 
The same plain terms that fix the lessee's duty to pay royalty also 
define the benefit the lessor is entitled to receive. Thus, under the 
leases, Yzaguirre and the other Royalty Owners are entitled to a 
market-value royalty, not an amount-realized royalty. 194 
2. Sheppard Contradicts Plain Meaning Cases: Hitzelberger and HECI 
Consistent with the Texas Supreme Court's resolution of the "market 
value royalty" issue, courts have resolved other oil and gas lease issues 
with the plain meaning approach. In a 1997 decision, Hitzelberger v. 
Samedan Oil Corp., an appellate court construed a termination clause 
virtually identical to the one at issue in Sheppard. 195 That court 
characterized the language as unambiguous, rejected the notion that the 
canon of construction "the law abhors forfeiture" changed the effect of 
the clause, and found that as a matter of law the lessee's failure to abide 
by the royalty payment timeline terminated the lease: "We believe the 
forfeiture of a lease that is included in a pooled unit is especially 
distasteful to the law. However, we also believe that it is the lessee's 
191. 613 S.W.2d 240 (Tex. 1981). 
192. /d. at 245. 
193. 53 S.W.3d 368, 369-70 (Tex. 2001) . 
194. /d. at 372-73 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
195. Hitzelberger v. Samedan Oil Corp., 948 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, pet. 
denied). 
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responsibility to comply with lease and unit obligations to keep the lease 
in effect." 196 
Hitzelberger provides direct precedent for the Texas Supreme Court's 
analysis of the termination of Sheppard's lease. Because that clause, like 
Sheppard's, did not expressly excuse the lessee's failure to pay timely 
based on a mistake, the Hitzelberger court of appeals enforced it as 
written.197 In Sheppard, however, the Texas Supreme Court never 
mentions that opinion. Instead, the court sympathizes with the lessee's 
failure to abide by the plain terms of the royalty payment timeline and 
grants it an opportunity to recover costs drilled while its lease was in 
effect.198 
Unlike the Sheppard opinion, in Hitzelberger the court declined to 
ignore the express terms of the parties' lease or to rewrite them to 
achieve a result it deemed equitable. In addition to the "market value 
royalty" cases, the Texas Supreme Court had followed this approach in 
other oil and gas lease cases.199 In fact, the court followed the Hitzelberger 
view in a controversial1998 case, HECI Exploration Co. v. Nee/. 200 In that 
case, a royalty owner sued its lessee after it recovered a large judgment 
against a neighboring operator and failed to share a portion of that 
settlement with the lessor. By the time the lessor learned about the 
settlement, it was too late for him to file his own suit against that 
196. I d. at 508--09 & n.8. 
197. See id. at 505-06. 
198. Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419, 427-30 (Tex. 2008). 
199. See, e.g. , Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996) (adhering to 
literal language of lease royalty clause using "market value at the well" royalty valuation and 
charging lessor with post-production costs despite language that "no deductions" should be 
charged to lessor) ; Sun Oil Co. v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1982) (adhering to plain terms 
of lease provision granting additional royalty on "oil" not gas and rejecting equitable arguments 
that lessee must pay for oil and gas since it had done so for decades). For another recent case in 
which the court departed from a strict adherence to the plain meaning approach, see J. Hiram 
Moore, Ltd. v. Greer, 172 S.W.3d 609 (Tex. 2005). The case involved the interpretation of a 
deed, rather than a lease. Specifically, the court concluded the deed was ambiguous regarding 
whether the deed conveyed all of the grantor's royalty interests in a specific county. The justice 
who authored the Nee/ decision, discussed below, dissented and argued the deed was 
unambiguous and should have been enforced as written. I d. at 616-23 (Owen, J. , dissenting) . 
200. HECI Exploration Co. v. Nee!, 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998). See also Burney, HECI v. 
Nee!, supra note 12, (discussing criticisms of the HECI decision and describing failed legislative 
efforts to lessen the decision 's burdensome effects on royalty owners). Criticism of HECI v. Nee/ 
and other Texas Supreme Court oil and gas cases has reached mainstream media: "In the oil-
and-gas arena, the criticism of Owen [author of the HECI decision] comes from lawyers and law 
professors who have seen decades of precedents favoring landowners tossed aside to favor 
producers." Paul Burka, Judging Priscilla, TEx. MONTHLY, Nov. 2003, at 10. For a more recent 
article, see Mimi Swartz, Below the Surface, TEx. MONTHLY, Nov. 2009, at 108 (discussing the 
history behind and the ruling in the recent Texas Supreme Court case Exxon Corp. v. Emerald 
Oil & Gas Co ., No. 05-1076, 2009 WL 795668 (Tex. Mar. 27, 2009) (holding that mineral/royalty 
owners' claims were barred by the statute of limitations, reversing a multimillion dollar 
judgment against Exxon for intentionally sabotaging wells so they could not be re-entered)) . The 
article states that in the Texas Supreme Court, "Royalty owners have not won a case against an 
oil company in at least ten years." Swartz, supra, at 187. 
260 TEXAS JOURNAL OF OIL, GAS, AND ENERGY LAW [Vol. 5 
operator. The lessor sued his lessee for breach of implied covenants in the 
lease. According to the lessor, his lease included an implied covenant 
requiring his lessee to give him notice of its intent to sue. The lessor also 
claimed the lessee had been unjustly enriched since the settlement it 
received included damages to the lessor's interest. The court of appeals 
had ruled in favor of the lessor on these and other issues. The Texas 
Supreme Court, however, reversed in favor of the lessee.201 In so doing, 
the court proclaimed: "This court has not lightly implied covenants in 
mineral leases. Our decisions have repeatedly emphasized that courts 
'cannot make contracts for [the] parties.' ... A Court cannot imply a 
covenant to achieve what it believes to be a fair contract or to remedy an 
unwise or improvident contract . . .. "202 The court continued, 
"Contractual implications 'are justified only on the ground of necessity.' 
'Necessity' does not include reformation of the contract through the use 
of an implied covenant in order to achieve what a court views as a more 
balanced agreement. "203 
In addition to restricting the doctrine of implied covenants by refusing 
to read terms into the lease, the court also held that the lessor's cause of 
action was barred by the statute of limitations. In reaching that 
conclusion, the court determined that the discovery rule did not apply to 
extend the statute's four-year limit because royalty owners have an 
obligation to protect their interests and discover facts necessary to do 
so-including searching a variety of outside sources, such as Railroad 
Commission records.204 Similarly, in another case involving Sheppard's 
producer-defendant, Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Horwood, the supreme 
court again ruled that the lessor's lease claim was barred because they 
could have obtained relevant information from the lessee and gas 
purchasers. 205 
201. HECI, 982 S.W.2d at 883-84. 
202. /d. at 888-89 (citations omitted). 
203. /d. at 889 (citations omitted). 
204. /d. at 886-88. 
205. 58 S.W.3d 732, 733 (Tex. 2001). The court held the discovery rule was not available 
because the facts were not "inherently undiscoverable." /d. at 735. At least one court has 
pointedly criticized the supreme court's approach to the discovery rule in the oil patch: 
We have had limited exposure to oil and gas litigation. But it has been sufficient for us 
to comprehend that this is an area in which the smartest and most aggressive can make 
a great deal of money from a less-knowledgeable class of royalty interest owners. How 
are royalty owners, the trust officers for minors, lawyers, and judges, who are not 
knowledgeable about the state of the Railroad Commission records, able to 
distinguish between production records that provide constructive notice and those 
that do not? Rather than bringing predictability and consistency to this area of the 
law, we fear that placing the onus on royalty owners to hire the experts necessary to 
investigate whether the Railroad Commission records reveal they are being cheated is 
inherently unfair and unworkable in the oil and gas business environment we have 
come to know. 
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If lessors bear these extensive responsibilities to protect their interests, 
it follows, as the Hitzelberger court concluded, that lessees should bear 
the burden of reading and abiding by the plain terms of leases in their 
possession. In Sheppard, however, the Texas Supreme Court reads a 
"mistake" excuse into the royalty-payment timeline provision in the 
lease, ignores provisions requiring the lessee to bear all production costs 
while the lease is in effect, and concludes that equity allows the lessee the 
opportunity to recover pre-termination costs on remand-all in direct 
contravention of the HECI mandate quoted above. With this approach, 
the court has drastically departed from settled rules of law and document 
interpretation, encouraged parties to litigate even plain terms in leases, 
and destabilized the rights and liabilities of owners and operators in oil 
and gas leases and pooled units. 
VII. WHAT TO DO ABOUT SHEPPARD? CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Despite having received an impressive number of amicus briefs from 
attorneys with decades of experience and extensive expertise in oil and 
gas law asking the Texas Supreme Court to if not withdraw then explain 
its opinion in Sheppard, the court declined to do so. Instead, it overruled 
Sheppard's motion for rehearing a month in advance of the deadline with 
no further comment on the case. Now the opinion stands as part of Texas 
oil and gas law. To avoid the opinion's effects in the future , practitioners 
should consider several steps: 
1. Include express termination language in unit agreements and 
file formal documents terminating units. As discussed above, 
leases and unit agreements should expressly provide when 
units terminate and grant producers and interest owners the 
right to file documents terminating units. Filing such 
documents must become standard practice in the industry. 
2. Include anti-Sheppard clauses in leases. Landowners should 
include anti-Sheppard clauses in leases. These clauses should 
clearly state, for example, in the pooling clause that the lessee 
has no power to pool the lessor's possibility of reverter beyond 
the life of the lease as to any depth or interest. Other clauses 
previously considered unnecessary should clarify that "in no 
event will lessor be required to bear costs of drilling or 
production either before or after the lease has terminated. "206 
3. Delete the pooling clause from the lease. As TIPRO notes in 
the amicus brief it filed, this could be an unintended 
Advent Trust Co. v. Hyder, 12 S.W.3d 534, 539 n.1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) 
(citation omitted) . 
206. For examples of anti-Sheppard clauses, see the Appendix, infra . 
262 TEXAS JOURNAL OF OIL, GAS, AND ENERGY LAW [Vol. 5 
consequence of the Sheppard opinion. Ironically, while the 
court begins its opinion stressing the public policy value of 
encouraging pooling, the opinion's interpretation of that clause 
discourages lessors from granting lessees that power in their 
leases: 
While amici recognize that pooling of leases does 
accomplish well-established public and conservation 
policy goals, the opinion of this Court nonetheless will 
actually have the opposite effect. ... [C]ounsel for 
mineral owners may choose to prohibit pooling 
altogether to avoid any further opportunity for a lessee 
or this Court to reach a result contrary to established 
. . I f "I d I 207 pnnctp es o 01 an gas aw. 
One amicus brief succinctly summarized the effects of the Texas 
Supreme Court's opinion in Sheppard as follows: 
The opinion's analytical flaw is that it purports to base its holding on 
the express terms of the contracts at issue, but it does not actually do 
so. It goes far beyond the terms of the lease, the only contract signed 
by Sheppard, in an apparent effort to achieve a result it considers 
equitable for the lessee. But in trying to achieve equity for the lessee 
to overcome what it perceived as a mistake, the opinion creates 
uncertainty for everyone else in the industry.208 
Indeed, as the discussion in this article reveals, although Sheppard 
joins a long line of cases in which the Texas Supreme Court has adopted 
producers' legal arguments in oil and gas lease disputes, it injects 
unprecedented uncertainty into Texas oil and gas jurisprudence. Rather 
than discourage litigation, the opinion encourages parties to pursue 
disputes in courts since principles and practices previously considered 
settled now have been called into question. Therefore, for years to come 
attorneys, producers, title examiners, financial institutions, mineral 
owners, and other stakeholders in the oil and gas industry will grapple 
with the unfortunate legacy of Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard. 
207. Amicus Brief of Texas Independent Producers and Royalty Owners Ass 'n at 10, 
Wagner & Brown, Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008) (No. 06-0845), 2009 WL 357423. 
208. Amicus Brief of Tri-C Resources, Inc. at 12, Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (No. 06-0845). 
The attorneys for Tri-C Resources, Inc. are well-known experts in oil and gas law: Elizabeth N. 
Miller, John W. Camp, and Jane M. N. Webre, of Scott, Douglass & McConnico. 
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APPENDIX: SAMPLE ANTI-SHEPPARD CLAUSES 
1. Sample clause that addresses and combats the Sheppard holding that a 
standard lease pooling clause allows a lessee to pool the lessor's 
possibility beyond the life of the lease: 
Notwithstanding the above provisions [of the pooling clause], any 
other provision in this lease, and any court decision (specifically, 
Wagner & Brown Ltd. v. Sheppard, 282 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. 2008)) or 
law, all rights to pool the leased premises and/or the land described 
herein with other land are expressly limited to allow Lessee to 
commit the leased premises to a pooled unit only so long as the 
premises described herein remain subject to this lease and may be 
exercised by the Lessee only in accordance with the following 
provisions: 
(a) Lessee may only exercise the rights to pool as to the depths 
leased hereby and only as to the lands and depths as to which 
this lease has not terminated as of the date such pooling 
document is filed in the office of the County Clerk of the county 
where the land leased hereby or any portion is located. Upon 
partial termination of this lease, as to any portion of the land 
and/or as to any depths, the rights of Lessee to pool the land 
and/or depths leased hereunder may be exercised by lessee only 
for that portion of the land and/or those depths as to which this 
lease has not terminated. 
(b) If the leased premises, or a portion thereof, is validly pooled 
with other land to form a unit prior to the partial or complete 
termination of this lease, upon partial termination of this lease as 
to area and depths or complete termination of this lease, Lessor 
may at any time thereafter terminate the pooling and unitization 
of the Lessor's interest in any portion of the interest leased 
herein that has terminated in any such unit by executing and 
filing for record in the office of the County Clerk of the county 
in which the land leased hereby or any portion thereof is located 
a document identifying or describing the area and/or depths as to 
which such pooling is terminated. 
2. Sample addendum clause to be added as a Modification of Pooling 
Provisions: 
Notwithstanding any other provision in this lease, and any court 
decision or law, all rights to pool or combine lessor's interest in the 
leased premises and/or the land described herein with other land are 
expressly limited and may be exercised by the Lessee only in 
accordance with the following provisions: 
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(a) Lessee may only exercise the rights to pool the interest of 
lessor in the land and as to the depths leased hereby and only as 
to the lands and depths as to which this lease has not terminated 
as of the date such pooling document is filed in the office of the 
County Clerk of the county where the land leased hereby or any 
portion is located. Upon partial termination of this lease, as to 
any portion of the land and/or as to any depths, the rights of 
Lessee to pool the land and/or depths leased hereunder may be 
exercised by lessee only for that portion of the land and/or those 
depths as to which this lease has not terminated. 
(b) If the leased premises, or a portion thereof, or the interest of 
the Lessor in part or all of the land described herein is validly 
pooled with other land to form a unit prior to the partial or 
complete termination of this lease, upon partial termination of 
this lease as to area and depths or complete termination of this 
lease, Lessor may at any time thereafter terminate the pooling 
and unitization of the Lessor's interest in any portion of the 
interest leased herein that has terminated in any such unit by 
executing and filing for record in the office of the County Clerk 
of the county in which the land leased hereby or any portion 
thereof is located a document identifying or describing the area 
and/or depths as to which such pooling is terminated. 
3. Sample clause to avoid Sheppard ruling that lessees may be able to 
recover drilling costs incurred while a lease is in effect: 
In no event will lessor be required to bear costs of drilling either 
before or after this lease has terminated. 
